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The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists
ANYA BERNSTEIN†
INTRODUCTION
The No Fly List, which is used to block suspected
terrorists from flying, has been in use for years. But the
government still appears “stymied” by the “relatively
straightforward question” of what people who “believe they
have been wrongly included on” that list should do.1 In
recent months, courts have haltingly started to provide
their own answer, giving some individuals standing to sue
to remove their names or receive additional process.2 This
step is particularly important as the No Fly List continues
†

Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D., Anthropology, The University of Chicago. Thanks
to Daniel Abebe, Ian Ayres, Alexander Boni-Saenz, Anthony Casey, Anjali
Dalal, Nicholas Day, Bernard Harcourt, Aziz Huq, Jerry Mashaw, Jonathan
Masur, Nicholas Parrillo, Victoria Schwartz, Lior Strahilevitz, Laura Weinrib,
Michael Wishnie, and James Wooten for helpful commentary.
1. Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) (characterizing the
government’s response to questions at oral argument).
2. Id. (holding that United States citizens and legal, permanent residents
who suspect they are listed on the No Fly List have standing to sue for an
injunction ordering the government to remove their names or to provide
additional process); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 999 (9th
Cir. 2012) (noting the same for an alien with substantial voluntary connections
to the United States). Because the criteria for adding someone to the No Fly List
are secret, it will no doubt be a challenge for both courts and government to
determine how to implement any additional process due to those listed on it.
Peter Shane, The Bureaucratic Due Process of Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 804, 837-54 (2007) (outlining a due process regime that takes into
account both the rights of individuals and the needs of the government).
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its breathtaking growth.3 It is unclear, however, how a court
will evaluate that additional process when the listing
criteria are both secret and untested. This doctrinal
development poses a challenge not only to the No Fly List,
but also to the complex watch list infrastructure on which it
is built.
The No Fly List draws on a consolidated terrorist watch
list that compiles numerous other lists maintained by a
number of federal agencies.4 Agencies compiling their lists
receive information not only from their own agents but from
state governments, foreign nations, and private
individuals.5 The No Fly List is well known because it has
visible effects like impinging on rights to travel. Indeed, it is
precisely such effects that have led courts to recognize
standing to challenge them.6 But the No Fly List’s flaws are
inherited from the lists it uses. They, in turn, remain
largely unregulated, unappealable, and obscured from
public attention.
Commentators have argued that such watch lists raise
problems for privacy and due process rights.7 This Article
3. See Associated Press, U.S. No-Fly List Doubles in One Year, U.S.A. TODAY
(Feb.
2,
2012,
11:02
AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-02-02/no-flylist/52926968/1 (reporting that the No Fly List increased from “about 10,000
known or suspected terrorists one year ago to about 21,000” in February 2012).
4. Shane, supra note 2, at 807-08.
5. The precise number of watch lists, as well as of names on watch lists, is
difficult to ascertain because publicly available information is limited. See id. at
813-14 (tabulating watch lists maintained by federal agencies). For instance,
while internal FBI documents reveal the construction of a new Known and
Suspected Terrorist list in 2009, there is no public information about this list.
CJIS Advisory Policy Board Working Group Meetings Spring 2009, Staff Paper
4-5 (document produced in FOIA litigation) (Bates No. NCIC-VGTOF-8334-35)
(on file with author). The FBI has not published a System of Records Notice
about the new list in the Federal Register, as required by statute. See 5 U.S.C. §
552a(e)(4) (2006) (providing no relevant System of Records Notice).
6. See, e.g., Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 987, 993-94 (determining that plaintiff had
standing because being placed on the No Fly List restricted her ability to travel
even when the destination was not the United States and restricted her ability
to associate with others by attending academic conferences).
7. See Michael German & Jay Stanley, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers?,
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 3 (2007), http://www.aclu.org/technology-andliberty/whats-wrong-fusion-centers-executive-summary.
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broadens the frame, moving beyond individual rights to the
broader effects that watch lists have on the agents and
agencies who run them, the government that commissions
them, and the society that houses them. It also explains
why agencies currently lack the incentives to address these
problems themselves. Because current law fails to rein
watch lists in, they require external constraint. Focusing on
watch lists’ peculiar epistemological and social structure,
this Article identifies the key aspects of watch list creation
that require regulation. And it draws on developments in
regulatory theory to ground its proposals for reform.
This Article starts with the question of why watch lists
require more constraint to begin with. Legal constraints,
after all, usually exist to make people do things they would
not otherwise do. And at first glance, there seems to be
every reason to think that government agencies want to
make their watch lists work. If that is the case, we can
assume that agencies will try their hardest to create the
best and most useful watch lists possible. We would not
need to tell them how, or to force them to take some
particular route to getting there.
As I contend in Part I, however, the incentive structures
surrounding terrorist watch lists push agents and agencies
to exaggerate dangers, putting names on watch lists that do
not belong there. These false positives might be more
acceptable if they made watch lists more comprehensive,
reducing the likelihood that the watch list would miss
someone who ought to be on there—a false negative. But, as
Part I also shows, watch lists’ perverse incentives lead
agents and agencies to misconstrue the relationship
between false positives and false negatives. These perverse
effects endanger the very national security that watch lists
are meant to safeguard by discouraging the kind of selfcorrection that would make watch lists more effective.
Part II explains the structure of contemporary terrorist
watch lists, showing how information and knowledge are
produced in the watch list context. Contemporary watch
lists use the techniques of “big data” to collect information
and distribute the work of evaluation and prediction over
many participants.8 However, they largely eschew the self8. “Big data” broadly refers to the use of unprecedented quantities of data
for natural- and social-scientific analysis. The hope of big data users is to
harness large data sets to make interpretations and predictions independently
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assessment techniques that make the use of big data
reliably useful. Their distributed knowledge production can
help watch lists smooth over the peculiarities of individual
agents. But it can also exacerbate judgment problems by
stacking peculiarity upon peculiarity and giving the result a
veneer of objective truth. Explaining how judgment is
incorporated in watch lists elucidates the errors they are
prone to and helps clarify why a conflicted incentive
structure leads to a high false positive rate.
A high rate of false positives might still be acceptable if
there were no cost associated with them. And because of
their objective veneer, watch lists can seem like a costless,
neutral backdrop of impartial information about the world.
It seems as though they have no effects on the world
themselves. Part III argues that this neutral view is wrong.
As scholars concerned with individual rights have
recognized, unregulated, error-prone watch lists affect the
people listed on them in powerful ways. But watch lists also
affect the agents and agencies that maintain them, lowering
their efficacy and acumen by failing to provide reality
checks for their judgments. Further, watch lists skew public
policy by making terrorism appear to be a more imminent
and severe threat than it is, which leads resources to be
diverted from other programs into terrorism-related ones.9
And to the broader public, watch lists present a world
populated by terrorist threats that can often be recognized
with blunt categories like ethnicity and religion. That
of small variations across populations. The fears of their critics are that big data
usage techniques focus so much on the control of data itself that they neglect
testing the accuracy, or the normative implications, of their results. See, e.g.,
Data, Data Everywhere, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 2010, at 1-2 (reporting that
scientists and businesses have access to vastly more data than ever before and
explaining that this so-called big data poses unprecedented opportunities for
uncovering social trends and scientific truths, but also poses new challenges in
data management and interpretation); Alan Feuer, The Mayor’s Geek Squad,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2013, at MB1; Steve Lohr, Origins of ‘Big Data’: An
Etymological Detective Story, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Feb. 1, 2013, 9:10 AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/the-origins-of-big-data-an-etymologicaldetective-story/ (discussing difficulty of tracing the origin of the term “big data”
and giving the most likely sources); Press Release, Office of Science and
Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, Obama Administration
Unveils “Big Data” Initiative: Announces $200 Million in New R&D
Investments (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
microsites/ostp/big_data_press_release_final_2.pdf.
9. GERMAN & STANLEY, supra note 7, at 22-23.
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affects how people act in their society and what they see as
its most urgent problems. Watch lists, in other words, are
far from costless. They go beyond affecting individual rights
to affect government functioning and social structure.
Yet, as Part IV claims, the legal strictures that
currently regulate database use miss the point. They focus
on informational accuracy, not predictive efficacy. I suggest
that this lacuna rests on an outdated understanding of
contemporary databases as mere repositories for
independently existing information, not the sites of
judgment production and prediction they actually are.
Traditionally, government judgment has been subject to
legal constraint that can be reviewed in court. The watch
list context, as I show, complicates this approach by
introducing secret algorithms of prediction that result in
little that is cognizable in court. This limitation, I contend,
should not dissuade us from analyzing and constraining
watch lists. The absence of judicial review cannot obviate
scrutiny and constraint of government action in a
democratic society. Rather, as recent scholarship has
suggested, we must look to institutional design and internal
self-regulation to solve those problems that cannot reach
the courts.10
Part V proposes regulating watch lists by focusing on
the increased efficacy that comes with increased constraint.
My suggestions build on a growing call for government to
assess, and not only project, the effects of its actions. And
they stake a claim for Bayesian updating at the center of
administrative self-regulation—the kind of regulation that
increasingly looks to be the main way of controlling the
administrative state.11
Finally, the Conclusion examines the limitations of my
proposals and explains why any solution to the watch list
problem will always be partial. It further discusses how
similar concerns, and a similar approach, will be
appropriate to other government databases used to make
predictions about future human conduct, when their
incentive structures are similarly conflicted.

10. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s
Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2319-24 (2006).
11. See, e.g., id. at 2316.
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I. WHY ARE TERRORIST WATCH LISTS NOT SELF-REGULATING?
To the extent that terrorist watch lists play a role in
national security, we would expect the agencies that
manage them to create strict procedures to ensure their
efficacy. Given how central national security is to
contemporary government, the incentives for efficacy should
be so strong that such lists would not require additional
regulation. In actuality, however, agencies have not fulfilled
these expectations. Below, I explain how conflicts in the
agencies’ incentive structure cause this failure. I also
explain how mistaken assumptions about the relationship
between false positives and false negatives in the watch list
context make the failure to implement internal regulation
seem less important than it is.
A. Incentive Failures
Reports indicate that people are commonly listed in
terrorist watch lists based on suspicions ranging from the
constitutionally impermissible to the absurd. For example,
in 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
detained and refused entry to two British nationals en route
to Los Angeles because the agency concluded that the
couple’s Twitter messages suggested they were planning to
engage in terrorist activity.12 DHS did not credit the
tourists’ claim that they were joking when they announced
on Twitter that they planned to “dig up” Marilyn Monroe,
nor that a tweet about “destroy[ing] America” simply used
British slang for “party.”13
In another scenario, reminiscent of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation’s (FBI’s) notorious CoIntelPro operations,14
12. See Richard Hartley-Parkinson, ‘I’m Going to Destroy America and Dig
Up Marilyn Monroe’: British Pair Arrested in U.S. on Terror Charges over
Twitter
Jokes,
MAIL
ONLINE
(Jan.
31,
2012,
8:08
AM)
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2093796/Emily-Bunting-Leigh-VanBryan-UK-tourists-arrested-destroy-America-Twitter-jokes.html.
13. Id.
14. The FBI describes its CoIntelPro operations in this way:
The FBI began COINTELPRO—short for Counterintelligence
Program—in 1956 to disrupt the activities of the Communist Party of
the United States. In the 1960s, it was expanded to include a number of
other domestic groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Socialist Workers
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the Denver police department “built a computer database
full of personal details about people” engaging in
constitutionally protected activity, such as being “active in
political groups” like “a Quaker peace-advocacy group . . .
and . . . the pro-gun lobby.”15 Because terrorist watch lists
often gather records from local law enforcement agencies,
entries in such databases can lead extensive lives outside
the local law enforcement agency itself. Although the
Denver files were expunged after a Freedom of Information
Act suit made them public, “when a man listed in the
Denver files as a gun-rights group member got into a fender
bender, a police officer checking [an FBI terrorist watch list]
found him described as ‘a member of a terrorist
organization’ [and] reported the stop to the FBI as a
‘terrorist contact.’”16 The man’s record, in other words, had
made its way into the federal terrorist watch list; but its
subsequent expungement had not.
Yet more troublingly, agencies that manage watch lists
have been reluctant to create ways to improve—or even
evaluate—their efficacy. The Transportation Security
Administration, for instance, “operated its data-based
passenger screening programs for more than two years with
no system in place to report or correct errors,” despite its
famously high error rate.17 And in recent years, federal
agencies have increasingly exempted law enforcement and
national security databases from Privacy Act provisions

Party, and the Black Panther Party. All COINTELPRO operations were
ended in 1971. Although limited in scope (about two-tenths of one
percent of the FBI’s workload over a 15-year period), COINTELPRO
was later rightfully criticized by Congress and the American people for
abridging first amendment rights and for other reasons.
See FBI Records: The Vault, FBI: THE FEDERAL BUREAU
http://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).

OF

INVESTIGATION,

15. Ann Davis, Use of Data Collection Systems Is Up Sharply Following 9/11,
WALL ST. J., May 22, 2003, at B1.
16. Id. As this report indicates, records entered into one law enforcement
database can take on a life of their own as they are distributed to others, often
with no provisions for updating the secondary files when the original one
changes. Id.
17. Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal
Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 475 (2008).
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requiring agencies to ensure their records are accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete.18
For instance, agencies have exempted a number of
databases collected by the Terrorist Screening Database
(TSDB) from these statutory provisions. And in 2003, the
FBI exempted the entire National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) database,19 which holds a wealth of
information, including the names of people the FBI or the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) suspect of belonging to
terrorist groups or planning to engage in terrorist acts.20
18. The Privacy Act allows certain agencies to exempt some records from
some of its provisions under certain circumstances. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5)
(2006).
19. See Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation, 68 Fed. Reg. 4974 (proposed
Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 16.96); Privacy Act of 1974;
Implementation, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,140 (Mar. 24, 2003) (codified at 28 C.F.R. §
16.96); see also 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) (2006) (providing that “[t]he Attorney
General shall . . . acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification, criminal
identification, crime, and other records”); Interstate Identification Index (III),
SEARCH http://www.search.org/programs/policy/iii/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2013)
(stating that the Interstate Identification Index holds records of convictions as
well of arrests for felonies and serious misdemeanors). For a description of the
NCIC, see National Crime Information Center, FBI: THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ncic.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
20. See Privacy Act of 1974; Modified System of Records, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,774,
19,774-75 (Apr. 20, 1995) (issuing a System of Records Notice for the Violent
Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF)); see generally Passport
Information Sharing with Department of State: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Donna A.
Bucella, Dir., Terrorist Screening Ctr.) (describing the Terrorist Screening
Center’s (TSC’s) consolidation of names of known and suspected terrorists into
the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)); WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL 32366, TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION, SCREENING, AND TRACKING UNDER
HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 6, at 31-32 (citing unpaginated
front matter) (2004) (noting that the NCIC is used to disseminate records from
the TSC’s TSDB).
The most plausible reading of the Privacy Act suggests that the VGTOF is
actually not subject to exemption. The exemption notice states that the
“exemptions apply only to the extent that information in the system is subject to
exemption pursuant to” sections (j)(2) and (k)(3) of 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 28 C.F.R. §
16.96(g)(1) (2012). Section (j)(2) allows a law enforcement agency to exempt a
system of records containing 1) “information compiled for the purpose of
identifying individual criminal offenders and alleged offenders”; 2) “information
compiled for the purpose of a criminal investigation”; or 3) “reports identifiable
to an individual compiled at any stage of the process of enforcement of the
criminal laws from arrest or indictment through release from supervision.” 5
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Any law enforcement agent in the country can access the
NCIC. Officers routinely use the NCIC during common
interactions with the public, such as traffic stops, to check
whether an individual is listed in its terrorist watch list,
among other things.
The notice exempting the NCIC asserted that
“ensur[ing] compliance with” the Privacy Act’s requirements
that information be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete
was “administratively impossible” “because many of these
records come from other federal, state, local, joint, foreign,
tribal, and international agencies.”21 It also noted that,
“[w]ith the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or
untimely information may acquire new significance as
further investigation brings new details to light.”22
As the exemption notice suggests, terrorist watch lists
create a particularly shaky form of prediction for a number
U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2) (2006). Under section (k)(3), an agency may exempt records
maintained for the President’s protective services. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(3) (2006);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)(1) (describing the authorization of the United States
Secret Service to protect the President). VGTOF records, however, do not
identify alleged criminal offenders, are compiled separately from criminal
investigations and enforcement operations, and do not concern the protective
services. The proffered exemptions thus do not apply to VGTOF files. The
exemption would be difficult to challenge, however, for standing reasons. See
discussion infra Part IV.B.
21. 28 C.F.R. 16.96(b)(6) (2012).
22. Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation, 68 Fed. Reg. at 14,140. The notice of
final rulemaking does not address any public comments and does not mention
whether any comments were received in response to the notice of proposed
rulemaking. The contention that seemingly unimportant discrete pieces of
information must be collected and protected from exposure because they may
end up fitting together in some important but unpredictable way is sometimes
called the “mosaic theory.” The mosaic theory posits that, because seemingly
unimportant discrete pieces of information may end up fitting together in an
important but unpredictable way, they should be assiduously collected and
protected from disclosure. David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National
Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 633 (2005). The
theory has been criticized for encouraging an over inclusion of information,
overemphasis on secrecy, and general inefficacy. Id. at 632-33. Moreover, while
the mosaic theory holds that any piece of information may be useful someday, it
operates in a world of limited resources, where someone must determine which
pieces of information are worth collecting, keeping, and analyzing. See id. at
630. Mosaic theory claims thus obscure the decisions that unavoidably go into
information collection and data processing.

470

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

of reasons. Human conduct is especially difficult to predict
in areas with little historical data to draw on.23 Terrorists
tend to organize themselves in ways that are less structured
and regular than some other forms of social organization.24
And it is hard to approach emotionally salient topics with
the kind of dispassionate attitude that facilitates rational
projections.25
These difficulties should lead agencies to impose more,
not less, oversight on terrorist watch lists. And because the
Privacy Act does not define accuracy, relevance, timeliness,
and completeness, the agency could have issued regulations
interpreting them in the context of the NCIC. Instead, it
exempted the database from Privacy Act requirements by
claiming that the database’s weaknesses are unknowable to
the very agency that maintains it, and that this opaqueness
itself excuses the agency from setting standards for it. That
explanation itself, of course, raises the question of why
23. Jeff Jonas & Jim Harper, Effective Counterterrorism and the Limited Role
of Predictive Data Mining, 584 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 7-8 (2006). Jonas
and Harper explain that predictions made through data mining work best when
based on a wealth of historical information about how people behave under
various circumstances, but become much less reliable when less historical data
is available. They emphasize that very little historical data is available on
terrorists and terrorism. Moreover, focusing merely on unusual behavior cannot
effectively predict terrorist conduct: “Treating ‘anomalous’ behavior as
suspicious may appear scientific, but, without patterns to look for, the design of
a search algorithm based on anomaly is no more likely to turn up terrorists than
twisting the end of a kaleidoscope is likely to draw an image of the Mona Lisa.”
Id. at 8.
24. Karin Knorr Cetina, Complex Global Microstructures: The New Terrorist
Societies, 22 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 213, 214 (2005) (suggesting that
contemporary terrorism manages to extend its reach by “avoid[ing] complex
institutional structures” that allow a greater measure of prediction; rather, it
exhibits the “asymmetries, unpredictabilities and playfulness of complex (and
dispersed) interaction patterns”); see also TODD MASSE, SIOBHAN O’NEIL, AND
JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33858, THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY’S RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY: EVOLUTION, ISSUES, AND
OPTIONS
FOR
CONGRESS:
SUMMARY
(2007),
available
at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80208.pdf
(noting
that
risk
assessment in the national security field is particularly difficult because of “the
dynamic nature of terrorism” and the absence of specific historical evidence).
25. Dan M. Kahan et al., ‘They Saw a Protest’: Cognitive Illiberalism and the
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 900 (2012) (arguing that
cultural and emotional commitments lead people to radically different
interpretations of the same events).
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every routine interaction between law enforcement agents
and private individuals should include a check of a watch
list whose quality and utility is simply not knowable.
This reluctance to increase efficacy by assessing it
seems particularly out of place in the national security
context, where stakes are high. But growing evidence
indicates that this attitude is not unusual in the national
security arena. A recent National Research Council study
found that, while DHS has developed adequate risk analysis
protocols for addressing natural disasters, it has no risk
analysis framework for terrorism threats.26 Relatedly,
researchers have found that DHS rebuffs requests to
conduct risk or cost-benefit analyses for national securityrelated regulations.27 DHS asserts that the dynamic and
evolving nature of national security risk makes such
analysis impossible.28 Thus, the department promulgates
regulations while asserting that it can have no opinion
about their utility.29
This trend might not be so worrisome if terrorist watch
lists were subject to incentives that would assure that
agencies would strive for the highest level of efficacy even if
they did not publicize their processes for doing so.
Unfortunately, that too is not the case. Terrorist watch lists
may appear to serve a single purpose: to help the
government prevent terrorist attacks by keeping track of
suspected terrorists. But like other predictive database
uses, they actually serve multiple, competing purposes,
which subject government agents to conflicting pressures.
Specific goals like preventing terrorism are couched in
larger obligations like serving the public good and treating

26. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REVIEW OF
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S APPROACH TO RISK ANALYSIS 2 (2010).

THE

27. JOHN MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, TERROR, SECURITY, AND MONEY:
BALANCING THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND COSTS OF HOMELAND SECURITY 5 (2011).
28. Id.
29. This comports with scholarship finding that political salience affects the
substance of proposed regulations. See Stuart Shapiro & John F. Morrall III,
The Triumph of Regulatory Politics: Benefit–Cost Analysis and Political
Salience, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 189, 190 (2012) (finding that politically salient
proposed rules tend to have smaller projected benefits than lower-salience
rules).
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people fairly.30 Those larger obligations, in turn, have many
interpretations. In one familiar juxtaposition, some define
the public good in terms of community security while others
focus on individual privacy.31 Still others have other
definitions. Some may view restraining the government’s
intervention in society as a public good, while others view
the government’s role as ensuring fair treatment and safety
for all. Because what best serves the public good and what
constitutes fairness are subjects of debate in democratic
societies, these larger obligations are never finally defined
or uniform among participants.
These varied goals, moreover, coexist with other
motivations. Agents and agencies have performative
incentives to appear active and efficacious. And they have
rent-seeking incentives to ensure continued resources and
attention to their operations. One way of showing that an
agency that maintains a watch list is active and efficacious
is to put more names on the list. Agencies that keep watch
lists may face image problems when they list people who are
unlikely to fulfill their predictions.32 But they may also
benefit from listing more people at the expense of accuracy.
More entries can make the agency look more active in its
pursuit of the public good, even when they produce no
actual public benefits down the line.
30. Program Manager, Info. Sharing Env’t, Information Sharing
Environment Annual Report to the Congress, National Security Through
Responsible
Information
Sharing,
at
iv
(June
30,
2012),
http://ise.gov/sites/default/files/ISE_Annual_Report_to_Congress_2012.pdf
(noting that the agency had recently strengthened privacy and civil rights
safeguards on terrorism related information-sharing).
31. See, e.g., John T. Soma et al., Balance of Privacy vs. Security: A Historical
Perspective of the USA PATRIOT Act, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 285,
287 (2005) (positing that public sentiment tends to swing toward preferring
national security following a crisis but returns to “equilibrium . . . as the initial
threat dissipates”); Shaun B. Spencer, Security vs. Privacy: Reframing the
Debate, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 519, 519-20 (2002) (arguing that the trade offs
between national security and privacy are often misrepresented in public
discourse in ways that mistakenly make pursuing national security seem the
more rational and more achievable path).
32. See, e.g., Mike McIntire, Ensnared by Error on Growing U.S. Watch List,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, at A1 (detailing two cases in which people who appear
to pose no national security risk have been denied access to travel in ways that
severely impinge on their careers, and noting the rapid pace of watch list
expansion despite the frequent recurrence of such problems).

2013]

TERRORIST WATCH LISTS

473

Overlisting also has institutional benefits. A large list of
terrorist suspects suggests that terrorist activities are
likely. That, in turn, suggests that more resources should be
devoted to agencies that deal with terrorism. That cycle can
encourage rent-seeking in the form of spurious prediction: a
large watch list makes national security threats seem
prevalent, which makes the agency’s activities particularly
necessary, which encourages attention and resources to flow
to the agency and the watch list.33 That encourages agencies
to keep false positives—people incorrectly identified as
terrorist threats—on their watch lists.
Of course, agents and agencies need not consciously
decide to increase the number of false positives to bulk up
watch list numbers. Rather, the rent-seeking opportunities
may simply discourage agencies from spending the
resources to develop assessment mechanisms that would
reduce them.
B. Relating False Positives to False Negatives
One approach to terrorist watch lists holds that the
increased number of false positives is a negligible price to
pay. Any reduction in missed predictions, or false negatives,
justifies any number of spurious predictions, or false
positives. The point of a terrorist suspect database, after all,
is to prevent terrorist attacks, not to prevent inaccurate
listing. Inaccuracy, the argument goes, is a fine price to pay
for the benefit of avoiding an attack, because the cost of
allowing some very damaging events like terrorist attacks
to occur will always be higher than the cost of inaccurate
predictions.34
33. Cf. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING,
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 27, 156 (2007). Harcourt argues that the
practice of profiling leads law enforcement organizations to devote more
resources to catching crime in the profiled population. See id. at 27. This skews
public policy by creating a “self-fulfilling prophecy:” more crime is discovered
within the profiled group because more resources are devoted to uncovering
crime within it. Id. at 156.
AND

34. See, e.g., Richard Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 245, 246 (2008); see also RON SUSKIND, THE ONE-PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP
INSIDE AMERICA’S PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 11-41 (2006) (describing
this view). An analysis of the financial costs of the No Fly List estimates that
taxpayers pay in the range of $100 million per year for that watch list alone.
Marcus Holmes, Just How Much Does that Cost, Anyway? An Analysis of the
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But whether, and when, that is the case is not clear.
The always-worth-it view assumes a predictable trade-off
between false positives and false negatives. Because
including more names on a watch list means casting the net
wider, having more false positives leads to having fewer
false negatives. The model for this approach is the medical
test that correctly recognizes a particular condition but is
overly sensitive to its indicia. The medical test may
mistakenly flag many people who have the indicia but do
not have the condition, but at least it will also flag most
people who have the condition. Its false positive rate
assures a low number of false negatives.
A watch list with a protocol for predicting human
conduct that effectively targets indicia of that conduct can
present the trade-off in roughly the same form. But one
with less carefully designed prediction protocols—or one
that targets conduct whose indices are difficult to
determine—may yield a high false positive rate without a
correspondingly low false negative rate. Its predictions may
simply be more arbitrary than recognition of symptoms by a
medical test.
For instance, the terrorist watch list housed in the
NCIC, the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File
(VGTOF), asks agents to predict whether a person is likely
to commit a terrorist act using a set of criteria developed to
identify members of violent gangs. The FBI first developed a
gang list in the early 1990s but expanded the list to include
“terrorist organizations and members” after incoming
Director Louis Freeh reevaluated the proposal.35 Despite
Financial Costs and Benefits of the “No-Fly” List, 5 HOMELAND SEC. AFFAIRS 1, 2
(2009). In this Article, I focus on the nonmonetary costs that watch lists exact.
35. Minutes, National Crime Information Center Advisory Policy Board,
Atlanta, Ga. 52 (Dec. 14-15, 1994) (document obtained through FOIA lawsuit)
(Bates number NCIC-VGTOF-771) (on file with author). Taking up Director
Freeh’s suggestion, the Advisory Policy Board decided to “include terrorist
organizations of an active and violent nature” within the definition of “gang.” Id.
Based on suggestions from the Department of Justice Criminal Division, this
plan was revised to provide a freestanding definition for “terrorist organization”
that was “in line with the definition commonly used by the FBI.” Id. at 53. That
definition describes terrorism as “activities that . . . involve violent acts or acts
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within
the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State . . . [which] appear to be
intended: (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the

2013]

TERRORIST WATCH LISTS

475

this new addition, the criteria for listing a terrorist
remained the same as those for listing a gang member, “as
[those criteria] apply
to
members
of
terrorist
organizations.”36
It is not clear, however, that the VGTOF’s gang criteria
are well suited to pick out terrorist conduct or likely
terrorists. Specifically, the criteria for inclusion are either
self-admission as a gang member upon arrest or
incarceration, or two of the following: (1) identification “as a
gang member by a reliable informant”; (2) identification “as
a gang member by an informant whose information has
been corroborated”; (3) “frequent[ing] a gang’s area,
associat[ing] with known members, and/or affect[ing] gang
dress, tattoos, or hand signals”; (4) being “arrested multiple
times with known gang members for offenses consistent
with gang activity”; or (5) “[s]elf-admission” as a gang
member at some point other than upon arrest or
incarceration.37
Because the sociological characteristics of terrorist
organizations differ from those of gangs, however, applying
these criteria to terrorist suspects is not straightforward.
The criteria may pick out gang-related conduct, but have
little apparent relation to terrorist conduct. For instance,
many American gangs occupy particular territory, often
striving to control that territory in ways that mimic the
control of the state.38 But the United States has no
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of
a government by [crimes] or kidnapping.” 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A)-(B) (2006); see
also National Crime Information Center Advisory Policy Board; Meeting, 58
Fed. Reg. 27,752, 27,752 (May 11, 1993) (announcing that a “proposal for an
NCIC Gang File” will be discussed at the Advisory Policy Board meeting to be
held in June 1993); Notice of Lodging of a Consent Decree Pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 58
Fed. Reg. 60,212, 60,212 (Nov. 15,1993) (announcing that that the “status of the
NCIC Gang File” will be discussed at the meeting scheduled for that December).
36. See Privacy Act of 1974: Modified System of Records, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,774,
19,775 (Apr. 20, 1995) (specifying that the list would include identifying
information of “[i]ndividuals about whom investigations has [sic] developed
sufficient information to establish membership in a particular terrorist
organization using the same criteria listed above [for gangs] as they apply to
members of terrorist organizations rather than members of violent criminal
gangs”).
37. Id.
38. For example,
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territories controlled by or associated with terrorist
organizations in this way. Similarly, well-organized
American gangs are known to often favor certain colors and
clothes as external indicia of membership. In contrast,
terrorists in the United States generally strive to remain
hidden. It is thus unclear what kind of external indicia
would serve as the terrorist version of gang colors, clothes,
and signals.
The VGTOF criteria also give no indication of what
constitutes a reliable informant or what kind of information
would corroborate an informant’s claim.39 They do not
specify who qualifies as a “known” terrorist organization
member. If being listed in the VGTOF suffices to make
someone a “known” terrorist, the vagueness of the list’s
criteria may simply reinforce itself. Moreover, precisely
because the criteria are imprecise and subjective, one can
imagine a range of views on what is required to fulfill them.
Despite these fairly obvious problems, neither the FBI’s
System of Records Notice nor internal documents produced
in FOIA litigation have revealed an underlying theory that
would explain how the VGTOF criteria would effectively
pick out both gang members and terrorists. For instance, in
2002, “the military and other agencies” started
“fingerprinting the detainees in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
[B]y laying claim to certain ‘turf’ (i.e., by symbolically appropriating
spaces, policing areas, and monitoring the behaviors of strangers) and
offering services such as protection for residents, the gang effectively
imposes onto [a] formal space a symbolic map that residents of the
neighborhood are aware of and use to guide their own travels.
Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Social Organization of Street Gang Activity in an
Urban Ghetto, 103 AM. J. OF SOC. 82, 90-91 (1997). Venkatesh goes on to explain
how individuals’ movement through the area and through the city can be
affected by the dominance of a gang in their neighborhood. Someone “visiting a
friend” in another neighborhood “may minimize travel through those areas
controlled by gangs that are at war with the one in his or her own
neighborhood,” and even a non-gang member visiting a loved one in an area or
building controlled by a gang hostile to the one dominant in his neighborhood
might need a special dispensation to be allowed to enter the building. Id. at 105.
Some residents cease patronizing retail establishments and even social service
providers in neighborhoods considered risky to travel to or enter because of gang
affiliation. See id. at 106.
39. See TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR FACTORY: INSIDE THE FBI’S
MANUFACTURED WAR ON TERRORISM 16-17 (2013) (arguing that many FBI
informants have no reliable access to information on terrorism).
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Cuba, and other places with those being sent to [the FBI] to
. . . populate the [VGTOF].”40 As is well known, however, the
quality of American detention practices in the military
operations following the 9/11 attacks left much to be
desired: many detainees were victims of local political
conflicts or false information, while others were in a sense
sold for the high bounties offered by American forces.41
40. Minutes, Criminal Justice Information Services, Advisory Policy Board,
Chicago, Ill. 7 (June 5-6, 2002) (Bates number NCIC-VGTOF-4269) (on file with
author) (providing notes on speech by Michael Kirkpatrick, Assistant Dir. in
Charge of the FBI’s Criminal Justice Info. Servs. (CJIS) Division) (document
obtained through FOIA lawsuit). Publicly available records do not indicate
which two criteria such suspects fulfilled. It may well be that all of Afghanistan,
for instance, was considered a terrorist organization “area,” or that detainees
were simply treated as presumptive terrorist suspects by virtue of being
detained—despite the many known problems with identifying actual threats in
areas of United States military activity.
41. See, e.g., Ramzi Kassem, From Altruists to Outlaws: The Criminalization
of Traveling Islamic Volunteers, 10 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 85, 89 (2010–
2011) (“Bounty leaflets were designed by various U.S. national security agencies
and intelligence services and disseminated in Afghanistan after the invasion
that followed the 9/11 attacks. . . . Many of the men who, like my clients, ended
up in the U.S. military prisons at Bagram, Kandahar and Guantanamo were
turned over for bounties similar to the ones offered in these leaflets, ranging
from five to sometimes twenty thousand dollars, large amounts of money
anywhere in the world but especially in countries with less affluent populations
such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.”) (citations omitted); Stuart Taylor, Jr.,
Falsehoods About Guantanamo, NAT’L J., Feb. 4, 2006, at 13-14 (reporting on a
study that found that the best evidence suggests that fewer than 20% of
Guantanamo detainees had been al-Qaeda members, that many were not
members of the Taliban, and that most were handed over to United States
forces by “reward-seeking Pakistanis and Afghan warlords and by villagers of
highly doubtful reliability”); Mark Denbeaux et al., Report on Guantanamo
Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees Through Analysis of Department of Defense
Data, 2 (2006), http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf
(finding that Defense Department data show that 55% of Guantanamo
detainees had not been shown to have committed any acts hostile to the United
States; that only 8% had been classified by the Defense Department as al-Qaeda
members; that many had been detained based on very loose associations with
groups that were not classified as terrorist organizations by the Department of
Homeland Security; that most Guantanamo detainees had been handed over to
United States forces by Pakistanis or Afghans at a time when the United States
offered large bounties for suspected enemies); Tom Lasseter, Day 1: America’s
Prison for Terrorists Often Held the Wrong Men, MCCLATCHY (June 15, 2008),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/06/15/38773/day-1-americas-prison-forterrorists.html (reporting on a McClatchy investigation finding that dozens, and
quite likely hundreds, of United States detainees in the War on Terrorism were
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Without some empirical testing, we cannot know whether
listing Afghan peasants who had run-ins with their
neighbors or were turned over for the bounty also increased
the chances that people who actually harbored terrorist
intent would be listed as well.
Given all this, there is little reason to think that netting
more false positives in the VGTOF will substantially reduce
the number of false negatives. Because the VGTOF’s
criteria do not reliably pick out terrorist conduct or
terrorists, the relationship between false positives and false
negatives on the list will be much more arbitrary than that
in a medical test that is overly sensitive to the symptoms of
a disease. Without knowing the predictive protocol of a
particular watch list, and without testing its efficacy, we
simply cannot know how its false positive rate relates to its
false negative rate.
Moreover, even in stark and highly salient areas like
national security, it is not clear that the costs of any false
negative will be high. Watch lists, after all, target
potentialities. Given the practical difficulties of launching a
terrorist attack, a person who is incorrectly identified as
innocuous, despite having the propensity to commit a
violent act, is still quite likely never to do so.42 We cannot
decide whether avoiding a false negative is worth some
number of false positives without knowing more about both
the likelihood of harm and its likely severity.
The always-worth-it view also ascribes astronomical
costs to any false negative, and essentially zero costs to
false positives. But false positives are not costless. For one
thing, they decrease watch list efficacy because large
numbers of irrelevant entries make it more difficult for
users to distinguish signal from noise. Agents have a harder
time identifying relevant, useful information that
appropriately motivates action. It is well known, for
instance, that government agencies had plenty of
“wrongfully imprisoned . . . on the basis of flimsy or fabricated evidence, old
personal scores or bounty payments”).
42. See, e.g., AARONSON, supra note 39, at 19-34 (detailing the complexities of
terrorist attacks and arguing that most terrorist plots in the United States since
2001 are creations of the FBI, because most people prosecuted for terrorist acts
would not have been capable of planning or carrying out an attack themselves
but depended to a large extent on conceptual, logistical, and financial assistance
from the FBI through its confidential informants).
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information indicating that the man who turned out to be
the Christmas Day bomber likely posed a danger, yet he
was allowed to board a plane.43 The failure to spot and stop
him earlier can be described as a failure of attention to
relevant information. That information was lost in the mass
of irrelevant information surrounding it.
More data also makes a database more difficult to
maintain and increases data integrity, collection,
maintenance, and protection problems. For instance, a
Department of Defense (DOD) feasibility investigation
recently concluded that creating a database of all
Congressional Medal of Honor recipients—purely factual
information in the government’s sole possession—would
impose such a serious administrative burden that it was
“impracticable.”44 Maintaining information sufficient to
predict human conduct, as watch lists do, clearly involves
more data and difficulty than this purely factual
compilation. If that easier task is impracticable,
proliferating data on watch lists clearly poses a great
challenge.
The agents and agencies that maintain watch lists work
within a web of complex and often conflicting incentives.
Because the predictive work that watch lists do is
inherently uncertain and often difficult to test, direct
incentives to individuals are difficult to design. Some
scholars have proposed offering monetary rewards for good
decisions in the administrative context.45 But it is difficult to
43. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, SUMMARY OF THE WHITE
HOUSE REVIEW OF THE DECEMBER 25, 2009 ATTEMPTED TERRORIST ATTACK, 2
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/white-house-reviewsummary-regarding-12252009-attempted-terrorist-attack (concluding that the
intelligence community had sufficient information to know that Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab posed a danger but failed to “connect the dots”); Jeff Zeleny &
Helene Cooper, Obama: ‘We Are at War’, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Jan. 7, 2010,
4:53
PM),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/obama-reviewrevealed-significant-national-security-shortcomings/.
44. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (quoting “Brief for
United States” at 55) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Paying Bank Examiners
for Performance: Should Regulators Receive Bonuses for Effectively Guarding the
Public Interest?, 35 REG. 32, 32 (2012) (arguing that monetary bonuses linked to
the value of regulated banks and timing of regulatory decisions would improve
bank regulator performance by giving regulators a direct stake in the monetary
value of their decisions).
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implement a reward system in the absence of any
mechanism for assessing judgment. Moreover, because
watch list agents’ subjective intuitions are constrained by
watch list criteria and protocols, individualized incentives
would put the burden on the wrong party. Where the agency
has no way to test and update its predictive protocols,
rewarding individual agents constrained by them will have
only a small, and likely an arbitrary, effect.
Addressing agencies’ perverse incentives and revising
their assumptions about how false positives relate to false
negatives, then, requires systemic regulation, not just
individual rewards. Below, I propose requiring agencies to
define what constitutes a false positive and a false negative,
determine what levels of false positives and false negatives
are acceptable, and assess and revise watch lists and their
predictive protocols. To ground my proposals, I first
introduce how watch lists work, emphasizing the key
characteristics that differentiate them from other forms of
knowledge and suspicion. I then describe the social and
political effects that make them costly. Finally, I explain
why current law does not suffice to constrain them.
II. WATCH LIST JUDGMENTS
In the dictionary and in the law, a database like a
watch list is just an information repository.46 In this view,
the information in a database preexists its compilation. My
bank account number, travel history, and marital status are
facts just the same, whether they find their way to a
database or not. But watch lists exceed this simple
description. They not only compile independently existing

46. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a database as a “structured set of
data held in computer storage and typically accessed or manipulated by means
of specialized software,” while Merriam-Webster defines it as “a usually large
collection of data organized especially for rapid search and retrieval (as by a
computer).” See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
47411?redirectedFrom=database#eid (last visited Mar. 24, 2013); MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/database
(last visited Mar. 24, 2013). The Privacy Act instead uses the term “system of
records,” defined as a “group of any records . . . from which information is
retrieved by the name of the individual or by some . . . other identifying
particular assigned to the individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (2006).
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information; they also contain predictions about how
individuals will conduct themselves in the future.47
A. Combinability, Portability, Decontextualization,
Impersonality
The information in watch lists is easily combinable,
highly portable, relatively decontextualized, and largely
impersonal. These things are in themselves not new: we
have always been able to merge pieces of information,
transfer information to new addressees, and scrub
information of specificity. Still, networked information
storage has made it easier for information in one database
to be shared with new users, put to new uses, and combined
with information from other sources. The amount of
information that a modern database can hold and the ease
with which that information can be transferred,
manipulated, and combined is unprecedented—so much so
that a difference in degree becomes indistinguishable from a
difference in kind.
Increasing information collection and networking has
gone along with forms of information input that enable easy
combination. Narrative descriptions give way to
predetermined information categories that can be
harmonized across databases.48 Networked databases with
specific input fields can be combined with one another to
yield ever more diverse information about individuals. Such
47. Bernard Cohn’s classic study of British colonial knowledge production in
India introduces the concept of an “investigative modalit[y]” to capture the
activities that governments undertake to “classify, categorize, and bound the
vast social world” they seek to control. See BERNARD S. COHN, COLONIALISM AND
ITS FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE: THE BRITISH IN INDIA 5 (1996). “An investigative
modality includes the definition of a body of information that is needed, the
procedures by which appropriate knowledge is gathered, its ordering and
classification, and then how it is transformed into usable forms such as
published reports” and other evaluative conclusions. Id. Cohn’s insights,
developed to study colonialism, are broadly applicable to governments generally.
Watch lists can be conceived as an investigative modality of the future.
48. See, e.g., Richard V. Ericson & Kevin D. Haggerty, The Policing of Risk, in
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 239
(Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) (describing, as an example, how
Canadian police reports evolved from free-form narrative entries to forms with
multiple fields requiring specific information, sometimes chosen from a limited
range of choices).
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combinations can also reveal previously unnoticed relations,
similarities, and patterns through various processes loosely
labeled “data mining.”49
The same characteristics that make information easy to
combine make it portable: easily distributed and understood
beyond the circle of those who compiled or created it.50
Combinability expands the scope of what information can
reveal. Portability expands its audience—who it reveals
things to. By making information accessible to potentially
limitless addressees, networked databases like watch lists
expand the uses to which information can be put and the
situations in which it can be used: the packaging affects the
product.
The information held in contemporary watch lists is
relatively decontextualized, that is, easily removed from the
conditions of its production. Users need not know much
about the person at issue, the government agents who
entered the information, how the criteria were developed, or
how the information was compiled to be able to interpret a
database’s contents.51 Decontextualization allows a database
49. Data mining can be defined as “the process of searching data for
previously unknown patterns and using those patterns to predict future
outcomes.” Jonas & Harper, supra note 23, at 1. Jonas and Harper describe data
mining as “a subset of the broader practice of data analysis,” but note that
“discussions of data mining have probably been hampered by lack of clarity
about its meaning.” Id. at 5.
50. See Paul Kockelman & Anya Bernstein, Semiotic Technologies, Temporal
Reckoning, and the Portability of Meaning. Or: Modern Modes of Temporality—
Just How Abstract Are They?, 12 ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 320, 321 (2012)
(defining portability as “a way of characterizing the degree to which” a way of
producing meaning is or appears “widely applicable and/or contextually
independent”).
51. Decontextualization allows anyone familiar with the applicable symbolic
system to understand information. It has been contrasted in a number of
different realms of knowledge to information that requires more mutual
knowledge, personal experience, or situation-specific understandings to be
successfully understood. Indeed, that contrast has been seen as a central
tension in modern knowledge-production. See, e.g., EDWARD S. CASEY, THE FATE
OF PLACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY (1997) (discussing place and space); Martin
Heidegger, Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics, in MARTIN
HEIDEGGER: BASIC WRITINGS 305 (David Farrell Krell ed., 1993) (discussing
modern science generally); Peter Galison, Ten Problems in History and
Philosophy of Science, 99 ISIS 111, 119-22 (2008) (providing studies of scientific
knowledge production). In that sense, terrorist watch lists partake of a larger
trend of modern knowledge-production and its critique.
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to look like a world unto itself: the information it contains
appears independent of the world it describes.52
Similarly, watch list information appears impersonal
because the way it is compiled and transmitted obscures its
dependence on subjective judgment. Standardized forms
calling for particular information and evaluative criteria
presented as checklists give an objective feel to database
information. Determining what criteria should underlie a
prediction and whether a set of facts fit those criteria are
themselves subjective, evaluative processes. But the
personal judgment inherent in these determinations is
masked by the impersonality of how databases collect and
transmit them.
The combinable, portable, decontextualized, and
seemingly impersonal information in a watch list is used to
predict whether someone will likely commit a terrorist act
in the future. Sometimes, that judgment comes from an
individual agent’s predictions about someone’s conduct.
Others offer predictions through automated processes based
on algorithms that evaluate current behavior to predict
future conduct. Those databases move subjective judgment
from the direct evaluation of an individual by a person who
makes a prediction to group evaluations made by those who
develop the algorithm.
But in both cases, watch lists inscribe a governmentally
authorized judgment about an individual. Unlike most
forms of government judgment, though, they are subject to
few legal constraints—as the novelty of granting standing to
No Fly List plaintiffs indicates. Databases used in this way
do more than simply compile information. They also create
it.

52. Studies of language use link decontextualization of communicative signs
with their entextualization elsewhere. Entextualization has been described as a
“process of rendering discourse extractable, of making a stretch of linguistic
production into a unit—a text—that can be lifted out of its interactional setting.”
Richard Bauman & Charles L. Briggs, Poetics and Performance as Critical
Perspectives on Language and Social Life, 19 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 59, 73
(1990). In this sense, a database prediction is “self-entextualiz[ing]”; it appears
as a “formally autonomous totality” divorced from the communicators who
created it. Michael Silverstein, “Cultural” Concepts and the Language-Culture
Nexus, 45 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 621, 626 (2004).
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B. The Division of Evaluative Labor
Predictions made as part of database creation allow for
a division of evaluative labor among numerous participants.
Different people set the predictive criteria, make the
prediction, validate it, and use it. For instance, the criteria
for determining whether someone is likely to engage in a
terrorist act comes from one division of the FBI.53 Field
agents then apply those criteria in individual cases,
entering predictions that they submit to another agency
division, which affirms the prediction based on field agents’
entries.54
When nominating an individual who is not the subject
of an ongoing FBI investigation for inclusion in the
consolidated terrorist watch list, for instance, an FBI field
officer submits the recommendation to an FBI
Headquarters unit charged with reviewing the underlying
information to determine whether it warrants passing on to
the National Counterterrorism Center for inclusion.55 Those
predictions are then made available to all law enforcement
agents in the country to guide their interactions with listed
individuals.56

53. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; KROUSE, supra note 20, at 3132; see, e.g., Minutes, National Crime Information Center Advisory Policy
Board, Atlanta, Ga., supra note 35, at 52 (recounting how the Violent Gang and
Terrorist Organization File, an FBI gang and terrorist watch list, was developed
by FBI working groups reviewing a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
proposal for a gang list); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL AUDIT DIV., AUDIT REPORT 09-25, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES, at viii (May
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0925/final.pdf
[hereinafter TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES]; see generally
Privacy Act of 1974; Modified System of Records, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,774, 19,774
(Apr. 20, 1995) (issuing a System of Records Notice for the VGTOF).
54. See TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES, supra note 53, at viii.
55. Id. at vii-viii. For nominations involving people who are subjects of FBI
investigations, the intermediate review consists only of ascertaining that the
documentation is complete and error-free. Id. For international terrorist suspect
nominations, FBI headquarters first forwards the name on to the NCTC,
whence it goes to the TSC. Id. An Inspector General report found that the
mandated internal review was often not completed and that the “internal
controls over these . . . processes are weak or nonexistent.” Id. at xviii-xix.
56. See The National Crime Information Center, supra note 19.
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The people who interact with the individuals listed in
the database are, thus, far removed from the people who
determined that the individuals should be listed in it. In the
case of the VGTOF, for instance, officers who interact with
suspects on the ground receive no information as to why a
suspect ended up on the watch list: in 2009, the agency
decided that the reasons a name was added to the list
should not appear in the file.57 Those who apply criteria to
make predictions about listed individuals are, in turn,
removed from those who decided what the criteria should
be.
III. THE BROAD EFFECTS OF TERRORIST WATCH LISTS
Watch
lists’
combinability,
portability,
decontextualization, and impersonality, as well as their
diffusion of evaluative labor, help differentiate them from
other forms of knowledge production like individual,
interpersonal determinations. These characteristics lend
predictive government databases of all sorts both strengths
and weaknesses. And they lead to broad individual,
political, and social effects that are largely invisible when
we think of watch lists as mere information repositories.
This Part explores those larger effects, which comprise the
hidden costs that watch lists exact.
A. Effects on Agents and Agencies: Overconfidence and
Skill Atrophy
The diffusion of evaluative labor in watch lists leads to
cumulative judgments that are produced by many
individual participants at different stages of the predictive
process. Like many database characteristics, cumulative
judgment has both an upside and a downside.
By aggregating individual evaluations and judgments,
accumulation can erase psychological peculiarities such as
biases or other weaknesses in reasoning. Psychological
research has recently tested experimentally what
anthropology and sociology have always known: our
evaluations of facts and people depend on our cultural
57. Minutes, CJIS Advisory Policy Board, National Harbor, Md. 24 (June 4-5,
2009) (document produced in FOIA litigation) (Bates No. NCIC-VGTOF-6100)
(on file with author).
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milieus.58 World views, social connections, emotions, beliefs,
and personal experiences affect people’s judgments.59 Doling
out different parts of evaluation to different people may
ameliorate some of these idiosyncratic psychological
influences by diversifying the cultural milieus in play. And
automating parts of the process may make it easier to spot
the effects of cultural predispositions when they conflict
with realistic assessments.
Moreover, removing evaluators from the uses of their
evaluations may minimize some psychological impediments
to improving database predictions. Experiments have
repeatedly demonstrated that people tend to interpret new
facts to accord with their existing convictions rather than
allowing evidence that conflicts with their world view to
alter it.60 Because of this common phenomenon, people who
make predictions may be averse to finding out whether they
were right. Perhaps more importantly, they resist acting on
evidence that they were wrong.61 Separating those who
make predictions from those who guide the criteria
underlying predictions may alleviate some of those
psychological obstacles. Those who devise criteria could
learn from the mistakes of those who implement them
rather than from their own mistakes.
At the same time, cumulative judgment can also
undermine the efficacy of watch list predictions. Watch lists’
58. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV.
115, 119-21 (2007).
59. See, e.g., id.
60. See, e.g., id. at 121 (citing Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior
Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence Quality, 56 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 28 (1993)) (“Real-world people tend to be anti-Bayesians:
rather than update their prior beliefs based on new information, they tend to
evaluate the persuasiveness of new information based on its conformity to their
experience.”).
61. Daniel Kahneman, a pioneer in the study of such irrationalities, has
written about his own anti-Bayesian experience in the Israeli army, where he
was on a team that assessed the leadership potential of army recruits. Feedback
sessions regularly revealed that the team’s “ability to predict performance . . .
was negligible,” but this “had no effects whatsoever on how we evaluated
candidates and very little effect on the confidence we felt in our judgments and
predictions . . . .” DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 209-11 (2011).
Kahneman’s subsequent research has shown that this “illusion of validity” is
prevalent among those who make predictions. Id. at 211.
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depersonalized nature gives them a veneer of objectivity
that obscures the subjective, evaluative aspects of
predicting individual conduct. The notion of objectivity has
long teetered between indicating that a conclusion is true,
on the one hand, and indicating that it is untainted by
emotion or personal interest, on the other.62 As historian of
science Theodore Porter has pointed out, “[o]bjectivity as
impersonality is often conflated with objectivity as truth.”63
The lack of an explicit subjectivity in database predictions—
the absence of a visible person evaluating data and making
predictions in a way that other participants can assess—
contributes to the appearance of objectivity and encourages
the conflation of impersonality with truth value.64
In other words, diffusion may ameliorate the effects of
individual psychology by cancelling out biases, but it may
also exacerbate them by obscuring individuality. Worse, it
may lead to cumulative judgments that stack bias on bias. If
people at different stages of the evaluative process share a
world view and a cultural milieu, their agreement on a
prediction can make it seem more reliable even when their
evaluation merely compounds their individual prejudices or
predispositions through ideological amplification.65
62. See, e.g., Lorraine Daston, Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective, 22
SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 597, 597 (1992) (tracing the historical development of three
conceptions of objectivity: “ontological objectivity,” the pursuit of truth that
revolves around “the fit between theory and the world”; “mechanical objectivity,”
the attempt to “suppress[] the universal human propensity to judge and
aestheticize” by “forbid[ding] interpretation in reporting and picturing scientific
results”; and “aperspectival objectivity,” a related form that attempts to
“eliminat[e] individual (or occasionally group) idiosyncrasies” by combining
multiple approaches); Theodore M. Porter, Quantification and the Accounting
Ideal in Science, 22 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 633, 646 (1992) (arguing that the notion
of objectivity, though sometimes equated simply with truth, is better understood
as an ideal of “impersonality, standardization” that “reduc[es] subjectivity to a
minimum”).
63. THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN
SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE 74 (1995). Porter argues that American public policy
has historically been characterized by a tension between rhetorics of objectivity
and the deployment of expertise. American government institutions have turned
to “mechanical objectivity,” a devotion to rule-based analysis, when their
expertise was under attack. See id. at 4, 194.
64. See id. at 74.
65. See, e.g., David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, & Reid Hastie, What
Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 917 (2007) (reporting
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Moreover, the trend of federal agencies exempting
watch lists from Privacy Act requirements and eschewing
cost-benefit
analysis
for
national
security-related
regulations, discussed above, suggests that even when
evaluative labor is diffuse—and the psychological cost of
being wrong is thus lowered—government actors often
remain loath to assess their own predictive practices.
The diffusion of evaluative labor also helps
decontextualize judgment. Judgment becomes “black
box[ed],” looking ever less like evaluation and ever more
like fact.66 Involving computers in watch list predictions
further intensifies black boxing: automation can obscure the
very existence of decisions. In fact, however, automated
evaluation is no less evaluative. Combining data from
different sources, after all, requires some person to decide
what kind of data to combine. And deriving knowledge from
that combination requires someone to draw conclusions
about its relevance and reliability. Data mining may reveal
a pattern, in other words, but merely revealing a pattern is
not enough. It still takes a person to determine whether
that pattern is relevant to the problem that the watch list
addresses.
In the networked world of watch lists, it is easy to treat
information processing and combination as something
computers, not people, do. Combining information from
multiple databases to yield predictions is often seen, in Orin
Kerr’s words, as simply “data manipulation by a machine.”67
experimental results showing that deliberations among groups of like-minded
individuals led participants to take more extreme positions in a process of
“ideological amplification”); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 118 (2000) (“[G]roup discussion is
likely to shift judgments toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated
by the median of predeliberation judgments.”).
66. BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND
ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY 2-3 (1987) (“The word black box is used by
cyberneticians whenever a piece of machinery or a set of commands is too
complex. In its place they draw a little box about which they need to know
nothing but its input and output.”); see also id. at 253 (“The more . . . complex
[machines] are, the more . . . each part hides the other as they become darker
and darker black boxes.”).
67. See Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance Law, 11
BROOKINGS INST.: THE FUTURE OF THE CONST. SERIES 1, 4 (2011),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/4/19%20surveillan
ce%20laws%20kerr/0419_surveillance_law_kerr.pdf.
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But that presents a somewhat idealized description of how
information is processed. Machines do the aggregation, but
people have to determine what to aggregate and how to
aggregate it. People write the algorithms that machines
perform and interpret the significance of any results. As
Kerr’s description shows, however, the role of people and
their subjective judgments in these processes can be
obscured by the higher visibility of machines and their
seeming objectivity.68
The diffusion of evaluative labor also makes a
database’s predictions harder for any given participant to
assess. Those who give predictions do not generally know
how the criteria they apply were created and have no way of
assessing whether those criteria effectively pick out the
targeted conduct. Other participants similarly cannot assess
the strengths of the predictions themselves. The separation
of functions, of course, inheres in any organizational effort—
division of labor has been recognized as a key aspect of
complex institutions at least since Adam Smith. The
inability of any participant to evaluate the overall effects of
the predictive process is thus not surprising. It does,
however, make it all the more important for organizations
to have some means of assessing their predictive database
uses.
The diffusion of evaluative labor can thus facilitate selfcorrection in some cases while facilitating its avoidance in
others. It may be that certain areas are so emotionally
laden and psychologically salient that diffusing evaluative
labor does not suffice to ameliorate the psychological costs
of being wrong.69 It may also be that the politics
surrounding high-salience areas makes self-assessment
more difficult because it requires admitting our limited
ability to protect against risk, and it introduces balancing
requirements into areas that seem so urgent that balancing
seems inappropriate.
For instance, when prediction depends heavily on
agents’ evaluations but appears to rest on objective criteria,
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 323, 327 (2004) (noting that “a popular politics that . . . has tilted
decisively toward harsh punitivism” has made introducing cost-benefit concepts
into criminal law particularly difficult).
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agents may come to misrecognize their own judgments as
simple recognitions of fact. Over time, as agents accumulate
more of these recognitions of fact, they may become prone to
over-trusting their own judgments. With no external way to
test whether their intuitions are correct, and no internal
requirement to justify their conclusions, agents may come to
feel that their evaluations are simply correct. But without
any evaluation of their evaluations, we cannot know that
they are.
Over time, this process will lead predictably to lowered
standards of judgment: agents will feel increasingly
justified acting on hunches or intuitions rather than
requiring
themselves
to
work
through
difficult,
indeterminate reasoning processes that subject their own
conclusions to doubt. The watch list they create will act as
confirmation of their correct evaluation that an individual
should be on the list. As long as every instance of judgment
receives a positive response, judgment will appear very
similar to fact.70
The evaluative processes that watch lists employ
themselves form a part of their cultural milieu: they frame
certain kinds of action as having predictive value, and they
encourage different levels of self-reflection, self-doubt, and
self-correction. How evaluation is structured in a database
thus affects the assessment capabilities of the evaluators. If
agents are never exposed to their mistakes or forced to
reassess their instincts, they will make predictions under
the illusion that they are generally correct. Moreover, feeble
limits on false positives encourage agents not to examine
the underlying premises of their decisions. That is, they
encourage agents to have bad judgment.
The costs that the atrophy of judgment exact are tricky
to calculate. While it seems clear that an unrealistic
70. A similar danger faces any agent with judgment responsibilities, of
course. But the dangers seem to be starkest in high-salience areas like national
security. For instance, a Senate report found that after an intelligence agent
issued a report duplicating information available in major news outlets, a
“performance review . . . cited this report as a signature accomplishment.” S.
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND
LOCAL FUSION CENTERS
41 (Comm. Print 2012), available at
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/446657/fusion-centers.pdf.
Praising
people for imagining that public information constitutes an intelligence scoop
seems unlikely to move them to improve their intelligence gathering abilities.
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predisposition can damage an agent’s ability to make
accurate assessments, it is difficult to put a dollar value on
that damage. And while it also seems clear that overvaluing
the danger posed by terrorism can lead to a skewed
distribution of government resources, it is hard to know just
how much money or energy is misspent without knowing
exactly how overvalued the dangers are.
B. Effects on Governments: Simplification and Blinding
Leaving watch lists unregulated not only lowers their
efficacy. It also gives them undesirable power over the
course of policy. As a seemingly neutral representation of
reality, such predictions influence policymakers’ views of
their government’s most urgent tasks. That influence can
skew policy toward, or away from, particular problems by
making the problems appear bigger or smaller.
Studies of government knowledge production related to
complex, multicausal, dynamic processes have revealed that
certain characteristics and problems typify them. Drawing
on a range of work in social science and history, for
instance, James Scott has examined how states engaged in
a number of different projects have tried to take stock of,
and control over, nature and society.71 An underlying
feature of such projects, Scott posits, is their reliance on
“simplifications” that attribute particular importance to a
few traits.72 Those few traits come to define the entire object
that the government seeks to control. Simplified
descriptions make certain characteristics more salient and
direct policy attention to them. In a sense, they reshape
reality to make it more amenable to further, equally
simplified, description.
Simplification makes labeling and tracking members of
the relevant category easier. But it also inevitably ignores
other attributes that may become important in their own
right. Simplification also has its own recursive effect: it
makes certain characteristics more salient, thereby
71. See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO
IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 2-4 (1998). The book discusses, for
instance, the failures of collectivization in the Soviet Union, see id. at 193-222,
compulsory settlement into villages in Tanzia, see id. at 223-61, and the attempt
to order and plan forest growth in Germany, see id. at 281.
72. See id. at 81-82.
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directing ever more attention to them. But it inevitably
leaves out important characteristics of reality as well—
characteristics that may not be relevant to some particular
project, but that do not disappear simply because they are
ignored. Government observation techniques similarly
render people and entities more amenable to observation
and control by emphasizing characteristics that are
recognizable by those techniques.73
For Scott and others working in this vein,
simplification, or attention to discrete characteristics, is not
harmful in itself. Indeed, any representation of reality must
reduce reality to some extent. Problems arise, rather, when
governments take their own simplifications too seriously—
when they refuse to acknowledge the simplifying
relationship between the real and the represented.74 As
Andreas Glaeser has written, this is one of the “paradoxes
of rational planning”: planning depends on the “reification
of particular representations,” but reification itself
“obfuscates the knowledge that representations are . . .
operating in a realm different from what they represent,”
that is, that reality remains more complex and dynamic
than its representation reveals.75
Giving too much credence to the representation thus
impedes people’s ability to grasp the more complex reality
underlying it. A partial image not only stands in for the
larger whole but also obscures the existence of that larger
whole.76 When states take their own simplifications too
seriously, they forget that their categories are only
provisional schema that highlight particular aspects of
nature or society for particular purposes. They mistake
their own simplifications for complete descriptions.
This misunderstanding is self-destructive: the state,
fooled by its own seemingly perfect descriptions, is at the
73. See id. at 80-82.
74. See id. at 80.
75. Andreas Glaeser, Monolithic Intentionality, Belonging, and the
Production of State Paranoia: A View Through Stasi onto the Late GDR, in OFF
STAGE / ON DISPLAY: INTIMACY AND ETHNOGRAPHY IN THE AGE OF PUBLIC CULTURE
244, 245 (Andrew Shryock ed., 2004).
76. Id. (arguing that the representation becomes a kind of “fetish” through
which “an aspectual translation is identified with the totality while knowledge
of an underlying plurality is repressed”).
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mercy of all the unexpected, unexplored facts that it failed
to take into account. And if the state has not built flexibility
or correction into the system, it is powerless to modify its
approach or react to unforeseen circumstances.
Of course, acknowledging a system’s limitations from
within the system is never easy. Timothy Mitchell’s account
of the natural and social problems that followed the
building of the Aswan Dam, for instance, demonstrates the
complexity involved: looking backward to explain how the
dam project got started and how it affected its environment,
his account connects everything from changing class
relations in Egypt to the development of fertilizer out of
munitions production, to the natural habitat of the
mosquito, showing how each factor, and many others,
played a small role in big events.77 Mitchell argues that it
was a lack of attention to the inherently multicausal nature
of sociopolitical events—the illusion of complete knowledge
to the exclusion of local practices that did not fit into the
modernist paradigm of social and natural control—that led
to the dam’s problems.78
To see like a state, then, is to be a little bit blinded. The
blinders are self-imposed: made of an eagerness to assume
and a failure to doubt. We can always hope that acquiring
more information will smooth out these obstacles through
the law of large numbers. In the information age, it is
inviting to assume that the mere availability of information
itself provides the answers to difficult questions. But we
cannot free ourselves so easily from reliance on judgment.79
77. TIMOTHY MITCHELL,
MODERNITY 19-53 (2002).

RULE

OF

EXPERTS:

EGYPT,

TECHNO-POLITICS,

78. Mitchell applies to the study of economics and politics the detail-oriented,
interactional approach of Actor Network Theory, pioneered by Bruno Latour,
which asks how the multiple factors that contribute to any phenomenon are
interconnected into coherence. See id.; see also BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING
THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK-THEORY 1, 9-11, 21-25 (2007)
(discussing Actor Network Theory).
79. The best known version of this understanding—that technical expertise
cannot substitute for evaluation, and is to some extent dependent on it—was
probably Weber’s juxtaposition of formal rationality and value rationality. See
ROGERS BRUBAKER, THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL AND
MORAL THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER 4 (1984) (“[W]hat is rational from one point of
view may be non-rational or irrational from another,” so that “[t]o the extent
that people share ends and beliefs, they can agree in their judgments of
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To become meaningful—to become knowledge—information
must be interpreted.
This suggests that evaluations that are not continually
examined for correspondence with reality will, with great
likelihood, deviate from it. Without consistent attention to
the relationship between the image and the world it
represents—and without the assumption that any
representation will leave out important factors—database
prediction becomes less useful over time. But it also
becomes more powerful. Watch lists tracking overlapping or
redundant traits create the appearance of a proliferation of
those traits—rather than a proliferation of watch lists.
C. Effects on Society: Worldview and Urgency Mistakes
Watch lists can have negative effects not only on agents,
agencies, and governments, but also on society and policy
more broadly. Scholars have amply demonstrated that
government categorization profoundly affects both
individuals’ self-conception and their social status—the way
others, including the government itself, conceive of them.
The effects of any particular database use are difficult to
pinpoint, of course, and their evaluative process often not
susceptible to empirical observation. But a number of
studies of similar or related processes provide a solid basis
on which to work by analogy in considering how watch lists
can affect more than the people who run them.
As numerous studies have shown, when governments
and other powerful institutions create new social categories,
“people . . . come to fit [those] categories” by reconceiving
themselves in the categories’ terms.80 Perhaps the best
rationality and irrationality; but to the extent ends and beliefs diverge, so too
will judgments of rationality and irrationality.”).
80. Ian Hacking, Making Up People, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER 161
(Mario Biagioli ed., 1999). The full sentence is “[p]eople spontaneously come to
fit their categories,” but Hacking follows it with a demonstration of how such
“spontaneity” depends on social, historical, and economic structures through
which new categorizations are institutionalized. See id. at 161-69. To describe
this process, which can involve both the introduction of a classification by “a
community of experts who create a ‘reality’ that some people make their own”
and “the autonomous behavior of the person so labeled, which . . . creat[es] a
reality every expert must face,” id. at 168, Hacking coins the term “dynamic
nominalism”: a dynamic nominalist approach holds “not that there was a kind of
person who came increasingly to be recognized by bureaucrats or by students of
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known scholar in this vein is still Michel Foucault, whose
theoretical work drew attention to how the category of
normal behavior leads individuals to reinterpret their own
conduct and its relation to society.81 Such studies have given
empirical grounding to an insight vividly captured by Louis
Althusser with the image of a person walking down the
street when a policeman calls out, “[h]ey, you there!”82
Without being named, the person stops and turns around.83
He has been interpellated84—not just encompassed, but also
defined and designated, by the state.85
Some of the clearest demonstrations of this defining
power come in studies of mass categorization in which
governments assign ethnic, religious, or hierarchical status
to people based on a few characteristics like place of birth,
kinship structure, or profession.86 The individuals who are
human nature but rather that a kind of person came into being at the same time
as the kind itself was being invented.” Id. at 165.
81. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1979) (1975) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH]; see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF
INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 38-64 (Richard Howard trans., Vintage Books
1st ed. 1973) (1961); IAN HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY
AND THE SCIENCES OF MEMORY 21-38 (1998) [hereinafter HACKING, REWRITING
THE SOUL] (describing the emergence of multiple personality disorder as a new
self-description that was then taken up by people who fit themselves into this
new category until it receded from both professional psychological and popular
attention); IAN HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE 1-3 (1990) [hereinafter
HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE] (describing the historical emergence of the
science of statistics, as a way of determining normality in a quantifiable way).
82. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN
Brewster trans., 1971).

AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 174-75 (Ben

83. Id.
84. See id.
85. The term interpellate puns on the combination of interpolate and name
(appeler in French).
86. The Soviet government’s anti-nationalist policy of “institutionalized
multinationality,” for instance, inscribed sub-state nationality—that is, a
national belonging to one of the Soviet republics—in people’s passports in an
attempt to control mobility and defuse political opposition. See ROGERS
BRUBAKER, NATIONALISM REFRAMED: NATIONHOOD AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION
IN THE NEW EUROPE 23, 32 (1996). Brubaker shows how this policy, which aimed
at creating unity among the Soviet republics, actually strengthened national
identities. See id. at 32.
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defined by these new categories may initially feel little
connection to one another. Indeed, the new categories may
seem somewhat arbitrarily assigned. But the very power of
government definitions opens up room for those people to
form groups—often politically important ones—on the basis
of their shared identification with these categories.87
No less important is the way that others—such as
governments themselves—come to view those who have
been assigned to a category. Ian Haney López, for instance,
has shown how case law on immigration status has helped
mold social understandings of race in the United States.88
Although a 1952 amendment eliminated race-based
restrictions on naturalization, the jurisprudence that
preceded the amendment helped shape the concept of race
in America.89 Because the opportunity to naturalize was
granted primarily to free “white person[s],” and “persons of
African nativity, or African descent,”90 those who wished to
naturalize were forced to frame their ethnicity in these
governing terms, leading to a series of judicial opinions
exploring, and cementing, particular notions of race.91 The
theory the Supreme Court settled on, Haney López shows,
presented racial belonging as something easily visible to the
naked eye—a restrictive notion of cultural and visual
similarity.92 This know-it-when-you-see-it understanding of
race in the immigration context, Haney López argues, would
have an enduring effect on American concepts of race
generally. The immigration case law reinforced the concept
of race as an inherent, obvious characteristic not subject to
change over time, nor available to emendation due to new
87. For example, after the Chinese government consolidated a number of
Muslim Chinese groups under the new catch-all category of Hui, the people so
labeled came to use the classification as a unifying basis for pan-Hui political
activism. See DRU C. GLADNEY, MUSLIM CHINESE: ETHNIC NATIONALISM IN THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 6 (1996). Ian Hacking describes this process as the “looping
effect of human kinds.” See HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL, supra note 81, at 21.
88. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
7, 12-13 (2006). Looking at medicine rather than law, Ian Hacking has analyzed
how the recognition of multiple personality disorder led to its prevalence as a
diagnosed condition. See HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL, supra note 81, at 8-9.
89. HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 88, at 33.
90. Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See id. at 35.
92. See id. at 64.
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information
about
migration
patterns,
linguistic
development, or other historical facts.93
Tracing a similar process in the colonial world, Bernard
Cohn has shown that, although the Indian caste system
appears to be an atavistic remnant of a premodern social
system, it was largely created through the British colonial
census.94 That census recorded individual attributes that
defined people in important ways, but that had always been
assumed to be subject to change over time.95 Census
categories, in contrast, treated these attributes as
unalterable signifiers of permanent social status.96 It thus
reified hierarchies that had previously been responsive to
both social and biographical change.97 Where caste had been
an attribute of an individual at a certain time, the British
census, which insisted that individuals be described in
terms of its categories, made it into an eternal
classification.98
Such research suggests that the categories of people
that populate database predictions can affect broadly held
conceptions of society. By creating categories of people and
making them seem prevalent, or rare, watch lists can affect
how both government actors and the public at large
understand the composition of society. This accords with
social psychological research indicating that people’s
assessments of risk depend on their cultural milieus,
including on their own “group commitments” and the
93. See id. at 71-73.
94. See Bernard S. Cohn, The Census, Social Structure, and Objectification in
South Asia, in AN ANTHROPOLOGIST AMONG THE HISTORIANS AND OTHER ESSAYS
230 (1987).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 230-31; see also COHN, COLONIALISM AND ITS FORMS OF
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 47, at 8 (“[W]hat was entailed in the construction of the
census . . . was the creation of social categories by which India was ordered for
administrative purposes. The British assumed that the census reflected the
basic sociological facts of India. This it did, but . . . the project also objectified
social, cultural, and linguistic differences among the peoples of India[,] . . .
le[ading] to the reification of India as [a] polity in which conflict . . . could only
be controlled by the strong hand of the British.”).
98. See Cohn, The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in South Asia,
supra note 94, at 230.
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opinions of others in their groups, as well the emotional
valence of the conduct at issue for them and the ease with
which they can imagine the risk coming to fruition.99
Changing how people think society looks can have
multiple effects. It can lead agents and members of the
public to more readily assume that someone is a terrorist
because watch lists have already assured them that many
people are terrorists. It can lead someone to interpret a
particular pattern revealed by combining information from
different databases as significant because the size of
terrorist watch lists has already assured her of the
significance of such patterns. It can lead local law
enforcement officers and low-level agency administrators to
pay more attention to those who are—or look like they
might be—watch-listed in ways that distract them from
other risks. And it can lead government agencies and
legislatures to overstate the likelihood and the probable
severity of the risks they deal with, skewing the distribution
of limited government resources by channeling them to
address low-probability events and to support low-efficacy
programs.
Ironically, such effects are most likely in the very areas
of high uncertainty that watch lists address. Government
bodies that assess and understand the efficacy of their
evaluative approaches can build that understanding into
their predictions. They can, for instance, triangulate with
external information, provide for regular reviews, or temper
their reliance on evaluations in which they have less
confidence. In contrast, where the government cannot, or
will not, evaluate its own evaluative process, it cannot know
how to modulate its reliance on its watch lists. This can
make watch list evaluations less reliable without lessening
the agency’s reliance on them. On the contrary, a database
whose predictive processes are not acknowledged can
appear even more reliable than one whose pressure points
are recognized.100
99. See Kahan, supra note 58, at 120.
100. Cf. Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty,
and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 721-24,
783 (2007) (arguing that the government monopoly over forensic methods—
including their creation, testing, and execution—makes them particularly
unreliable because they are subject to neither external oversight nor internal
accountability checks).
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The government as an institution has a pervasive power
to shape social categories. Government databases like watch
lists can thus affect how government agents and members
of the public conceptualize their society and how they
choose
to
distribute
resources
based
on
that
conceptualization. That power can become dangerous when
we forget that the image of society presented in database
predictions is not a simple reflection of reality. Rather, it is
a creature of our government. We should be able to discuss
and assess not just the validity but also the desirability of
imagining society in some particular way. But when we
ignore the way that this image is created, we let the
government off the normative hook.
IV. THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE LEGAL REGIME
Many of the evaluations our government makes about
us are constrained by a legal regime. Not only court
judgments but many administrative conclusions must
comport with the numerous requirements of due process
and can be challenged if they fail to do so. Databases like
watch lists, in contrast, are primarily governed by privacy
law.101 That law constrains how the government gathers
information and, to a smaller extent, what kind of
information it uses.102 But it says little about evaluation,
much less prediction. The predictive work performed in
watch lists thus remains largely unregulated and
unacknowledged by the law.
This might be acceptable if watch lists had negligible
effects. And from a certain perspective, they do: being listed
as a terrorist suspect does not constitute probable cause for
arrest.103 Yet watch listing clearly has effects on individuals.
101. See Cate, supra note 17, at 451 (documenting the scope of constitutional
privacy protections for government database information); id. at 461 (discussing
statutory provisions constraining government database information collection).
102. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
103. According to a draft update, for instance, the NCIC Technical Operational
Manual warns that a VGTOF “Group Member Capability” entry—that is, an
individual listing on the watch list—does not constitute probable cause for
arrest, search, or seizure, though it may form part of the probable cause inquiry.
See National Crime Information Center; Technical and Operational Update, 9
(Nov. 7, 2005) (document produced in FOIA litigation) (NCIC-VGTOF-6891) (on
file with author) (“[P]robable cause to search or seize is not established by the
[VGTOF] record standing alone. . . . A caveat appears with every [VGTOF]
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It can, as courts have begun to recognize, impinge on their
right to travel.104 It can also change individuals’ status in
the eyes of the law enforcement community, drawing extra
scrutiny and suspicion. And although it cannot form the sole
basis for probable cause, it can factor into a probable cause
inquiry and a bail determination.105 Moreover, as Part III
demonstrated, watch lists have governmental, political, and
social effects that far exceed their individual encumbrances.
In this broader frame, the absence of determinate legal
consequences for the individual becomes only one concern.
Government accountability, after all, accrues to all
government actions, not just those with determinate legal
consequences for individuals. Evaluating watch lists
involves asking whether governments produce knowledge
responsibly and accountably. As I show in this Part, current
legal strictures, as well as scholarly analyses, skirt that
crucial question.
A. The Statutory Framework
When Congress passed the Privacy Act in 1974, it knew
it was dealing with something big. A Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) report had recently
canvassed the unprecedented growth in government records
about individuals, stressing the dangers it posed to a free
society and proposing a number of “Fair Information

record warning against search or seizure established solely on the record. This
does not mean that a [VGTOF] record has no relevance to either reasonable
suspicion to investigatively detain a record subject . . . , to arrest a record
subject based on probable cause, or to search premises or vehicles based on
probable cause.”).
104. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
105. See United States v. Duque, No. CR-09-265-D, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
102199, at *13-14 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 2, 2009) (describing presence on the Violent
Gang and Terrorist Organization File as part of “officers’ collective knowledge,”
reasonably used to determine probable cause for an arrest); Ted Metzger & Ann
O’Neill, Protester Jailed, Denies He’s a Terrorist, CNN POLITICS (Sept. 6, 2012,
7:27
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/06/politics/protester-arrestcontroversy/index.html (reporting that officer who arrested political protester
for a minor traffic charge requested a judge to set bail at $10,000 and keep
protester detained throughout a Democratic National Committee convention
because the man was a “[k]nown activist + protester who is currently on a
terrorist watch list”).
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Practices” to protect individual rights.106 And a
Congressional investigation headed by Senator Frank
Church had yielded shocking revelations about the law
enforcement community’s incursions into political groups—
the CoIntelPro activities that had disrupted lawful political
activity, instigated violence through purposeful deception,
and sought to discredit political activists by publicizing
personal information about them.107 The Congress that
passed the Privacy Act was primarily concerned with two
possibilities: information in government databases might be
incorrect due to data integrity problems, mistakes, or
purposeful
falsehoods—and
it
might
be
used
inappropriately as it was in the CoIntelPro operations.108
The growth of government records had occurred
gradually and rather quietly. In 1909, for instance, Attorney
General Charles Bonaparte testified to Congress that his
Department had begun keeping records of “people who are
actually in penitentiaries,” but denied any interest in
keeping records about those who had been only arrested,
not convicted.109 Ten years later, an unheralded report from

106. Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, Report of the Secretary’s
Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, HHS PRIVACY COMM.
(July 1973), http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/privacy/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013)
(noting vastly increased government information maintenance about
individuals, examining its actual and potential problems, and proposing
information management principles).
107. See, e.g., FRANK CHURCH, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF
AMERICANS: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 120 (1976) [hereinafter Church Report].
108. Cf. at 314 (documenting abuses); see generally WARD CHURCHILL & JIM
VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE FBI’S SECRET
WARS AGAINST DISSENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2002) (documenting
abuses); WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION: THE
FBI’S SECRET WARS AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE AMERICAN
INDIAN MOVEMENT (1988) (documenting abuses).
109. The Prevention of Fraud in and Depredations Upon the Public Service:
Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Appropriations, 60th Cong. 424 (1909)
(testimony of Charles Bonaparte, Attorney Gen. of the United States) (question
by Congressman Fitzgerald). Attorney General Bonaparte noted that:
Some persons have the idea that [collecting records of those arrested
but not convicted] is of great value in the identification of criminals.
How far that is well founded I am not prepared to express a positive
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a special agent blithely noted just such an accounting,
explaining that local law enforcement officials provided the
federal government with finger prints and “records of arrest
or conviction, as the case may be.”110
As federal record keeping grew, Congress occasionally
played catch-up to legalize practices that were already
standard within the agencies.111 But just as often, there was
no Congressional action at all: keeping records about
individuals was increasingly simply something agencies
did.112 Now, in the wake of the HEW report and the Church
Committee revelations, that simple thing had become newly
opinion. As far as our own records are concerned we merely take the
records of the people who are at the federal penitentiaries.
Id. at 425. Similarly, the Attorney General’s 1907 report to Congress describes
the Department’s “criminal identification records” as records of “persons
convicted of crimes against the United States.” ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR 1907, H.R. DOC. NO. 10,
at 44 (1907) (noting that these records “have been removed for preservation
from the United States penitentiaries to the Department of Justice”).
110. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
YEAR 1920, H.R. DOC. NO. 886, at 641 (1920) (Report of Special Agent A. J.
Renoe) (emphasis added). By 1930, “[a]rrangements were effected whereby all
United States marshals now submit to the division the fingerprints of all
persons taken into custody by them.” ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR 1930, H.R. DOC. NO. 530, at 80
(1930).
111. For example, the FBI had been collecting criminal history records of some
kind since the early part of the twentieth century. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR 1917, H.R. DOC. NO.
595, at 89 (1917) (under the heading of “Bureau of Criminal Identification”);
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR
1911, H.R. DOC. NO. 117, at 22 (1911) (under the heading of “Bureau of
Investigation”); H.R. DOC. NO. 10, supra note 109, at 44-45 (reporting criminal
history record collection under the heading “Criminal Identification Records”).
But it was not until 1930 that Congress officially recognized what the FBI was
already doing by establishing a Division of Identification and Information
charged with collecting “criminal identification and other crime records.” Act of
June 11, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-337, 46 Stat. 554 (1930).
112. Agency information-collection activities in excess of statutory
authorization appear, from this history, to be the norm rather than the
exception. See, e.g., Doe v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. M54(HB), 2004 WL 1469464 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2004) (holding that the
inclusion of non-criminal immigration information in the NCIC, which the
government claimed was mandatory, was in fact contrary to the statute
authorizing the NCIC).
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controversial. Like a mother startled to find an unruly
adolescent where she had last seen a docile child, members
of Congress felt pressed to take action: not just to catch up
with agency practices but to control them.
Not surprisingly, they did so with a focus on individual
rights. That is what the HEW report had worried about;
that is what had been violated by CoIntelPro. While the
Privacy Act went through numerous iterations and
compromises, its central goal remained clear: to delineate
and protect individuals’ right to control the flow of
information about themselves.113 The preamble states that
“[t]he privacy of an individual is directly affected by the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of personal
information by Federal agencies,”114 and describes the act’s
purpose as “provid[ing] certain safeguards for an individual
against an invasion of personal privacy.”115 At the same
time, the act leaves largely unregulated the kind of
information
the
government
may
collect
about
individuals.116 Rather, it primarily controls how federal
agencies gather, share, and store information about
individuals.117

113. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV. OPERATIONS AND H.R. COMM. ON GOV.
OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, S.
2418 (PUBLIC LAW 93-579): SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, VII (Comm. Print 1976);
see also Alexi M. Poretz, Disclosure Under the Privacy Act: A Matter of
Interpretation, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 801, 802 (1997) (describing the Privacy
Act as a measure that “safeguards individuals against the invasion of their
personal privacy by restricting the manner in which federal agencies may
collect, maintain, use, and disseminate certain personal information”).
114. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, § 2(a) (1974).
115. Id. § 2(b).
116. The primary exception is that the act prohibits an agency from
maintaining records “describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (2006). But it exempts from this
restriction records that are “pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized
law enforcement activity.” Id.
117. See, e.g., Poretz, supra note 113, at 802 (1997) (“The Privacy Act of 1974
safeguards individuals against the invasion of their personal privacy by
restricting the manner in which federal agencies may collect, maintain, use, and
disseminate certain personal information.”). The Privacy Act also applies in
limited ways to organizations other than federal agencies. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §
552a(a)(10)-(11), (o)(1). I do not address those applications here.
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The Privacy Act relies mostly on external oversight: it
gives people who are the subjects of agency records some
knowledge about, and some control over, what those records
say and how the information they hold is gathered, used,
and distributed. The point is to limit agencies’ control over
information by forcing them to let individuals know how the
information is being used and who else got to see it, as well
as providing ways for people to see, contest, and correct
their records.118 The act also provides for some internal
accountability, allowing agencies to collect only information
that serves a specific legal purpose119 and requiring them to
ensure that information is relevant, timely, and accurate.120
As critics have noted, however, most of the powers that
the Privacy Act takes away from agencies with one hand, it
gives back with the other. Some provisions come with
automatic exemptions. Agencies need not limit their
distribution of records, for instance, if it falls within the
stated “routine use” for which the information was
collected—a use that the agency itself determines.121
118. For instance, the act requires agencies to publish and update notices in
the Federal Register describing their databases, outlining the categories of
records they hold and the categories of people they concern, and indicating the
routine uses to which the records will be put. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(A)-(D)
(requiring publication of System of Records Notices (SORN)). The act requires
agencies to inform record subjects if their records will be distributed and seeks
to limit the extent of that distribution. Id. § 552a(f)(1)-(4). It requires agencies to
provide procedures for individuals to see and request the amendment of their
own records, and allows for judicial review of an agency’s refusal to do so. See id.
§ 552a(b). It requires each agency to establish a board to monitor its record
storage procedures to ensure that the data are safe. Id. § 552a(u)(1)-(3).
119. Id. § 552a(e)(1).
120. Id. § 552a(e)(5). As a point of comparison, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) divides the database production process into the
acquisition, retention, and use of information, with each stage subject to
different requirements. See DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS § 9:1 (2007). For instance, federal
agents are required to “minimize” information disseminated to other parties,
making retention and dissemination a complexly regulated decision. Id. At the
same time, FISA minimization procedures primarily aim to protect the privacy
of United States persons. Id. In this way, they mirror the concerns about privacy
that I allude to. Despite more attention to how information is treated, then,
FISA also does not address the classification issue per se.
121. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(7), (b)(3). There are other exceptions on this
limitation, such as distribution to the agency’s own employees, for statistical
purposes, or to save a life, but the routine use exception, as it is known, is
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Agencies can also use other means to exempt their record
systems from all but a few Privacy Act requirements.122 The
probably the one that most undermines the original limitation. Id. § 552a(7),
(b)(1), (4), (8); see, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 136 (2004) (noting that the “routine use”
exception is the broadest exception); Todd Robert Coles, Comment, Does the
Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy? An Examination of the
Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957, 959-60 (1991) (noting that
neither the executive nor Congress has not “actively overseen the exemption’s
use[,] [n]or has Congress deterred continued abuse of the exemption,” and
concluding that the breadth of the routine use exemption renders the act
“impotent without more effective oversight”); John Shattuck, In the Shadow of
1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-Matching, and Privacy in the
United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1003-04 (1984) (“All that is required to
satisfy the . . . [Privacy] Act, the agencies say, is to publish each new computermatching [i.e. data-mining] ‘routine use’ in the Federal Register.”); see also
Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy
Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 695 (2007)
(proposing that Congress eliminate the routine use exception, instead requiring
agencies to “specify, up front, exactly how personal data will be used and under
what conditions it will be transferred to other government agencies”). But see
Major Lassus, Routine Use Exception Under the Privacy Act of 1974 and the
Requirement of Compatibility, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1991, at 45, 50 (asserting that,
despite being obscured by the “Act’s convoluted evolution,” the Privacy Act
routine use exception actually “impose[s] two requirements for release of records
under [the routine use exception]—namely, the procedural requirement of
‘notice’ and the substantive requirement of ‘compatibility’” with the original
“‘purpose for which the information was collected’”).
122. Some records can be exempted through the act’s “General Exemptions”
provision. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (2006). This subsection exempts a system of records
from all but a small number of Privacy Act provisions, specifically those that
require that agencies limit extra-agency disclosure to people with a need for the
record; keep an account on those to whom a record is disclosed; publish notices
describing systems of records in the Federal Register (so-called SORNs); make
reasonable efforts to ensure that a record distributed to someone other than an
agency is accurate, timely, complete, and relevant; not keep records on
individuals’ exercise of their First Amendment rights unless a statute expressly
authorizes it or the information collection falls within the scope of law
enforcement activities; establish rules of conduct for people involved in database
maintenance and creation; establish safeguards to ensure record security; and
publish any new use of a system in the Federal Register with at least thirty
days’ opportunity for comment before implementing it. See id.; see also id.
§552a(b), (c)(1)-(2), (e)(4)(A)-(F), (e)(6)-(7), (e)(9)-(11). Other databases, including
those that hold “investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes
[but not falling] within” the general exemption requirements, can be exempted
from several specific provisions. Id. § 552a(k). This section allows for exemption
from provisions that require agencies to make available to individuals who
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Privacy Act thus inscribes a limited right to control
information about oneself while giving agencies leeway to
deviate from that ideal.
The Congress that passed the Privacy Act was
concerned that government records could contain incorrect
or false information and that information could be released
in improper ways or for improper purposes.123 In this
conceptualization, the information at issue exists
independently of, and prior to, its acquisition by the
government. The information the Privacy Act is concerned
with emanates from the individual, from whom the
government must acquire it.
Commentators have long criticized the Privacy Act for
insufficiently safeguarding individual rights and failing to
update what safeguards exist to keep pace with
technological developments.124 But an even greater
limitation is the act’s understanding of databases and the
work that they do. The Privacy Act treats databases as
request it an account of how their records have been disclosed to others; allow
individuals to access, review, have a copy of, and request amendment of their
records; acknowledge such requests for amendment and either implement them
or explain a refusal to do so; allow individuals to file a statement of
disagreement with the agency’s decision and inform them of the availability of
judicial review; note any such disagreement in subsequent dissemination of the
record (except for information compiled in preparation for civil litigation);
publish a system of records notice in the Federal Register that informs people
how to find out if records pertain to them, access their records, and contest
record contents, and that describes the categories of records in the system; and
establish procedures to implement the notification, access, dispute and
amendment provisions. See id.; see also id. § 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G)-(I),
(f). Aside from law enforcement databases, this exemption can also apply to
records exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act’s (FOIA’s)
national security exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), and records “maintained in
connection with providing protective services to the President of the United
States or other individuals pursuant to section 3056 of title 18.” Id. § 552a(k)(3).
123. See Privacy Act of 1974 § 2(a), 88 Stat. at 1896.
124. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 137, 138, 179 (2008) (arguing that U.S. privacy law’s focus on data
collection improperly overlooks important changes in data retention that
changes how governments collect information and what information is available
to them); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 877, 877, 898 (2002-2003) (arguing that the United States lacks
“well-established legal rights” of privacy, and new legal rights must be created
to remedy policy violations); see also supra note 101 and accompanying text.
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mere repositories for storing information. It regulates only
the government’s power to gather or use information. Watch
lists, however, exceed those activities. They involve
evaluating information and predicting future conduct—acts
the Privacy Act does not address. This means that, while
watch lists fall into the Privacy Act’s bailiwick, they also fall
through its cracks.
B. The Doctrinal Context
Courts have not laid out what process, if any, an agency
must give a person it plans to put on a watch list. The No
Fly List cases discussed in the Introduction will serve as
test cases addressing that issue. But as this Article has
suggested, those cases do not address the larger and more
complex watch list infrastructure underlying the No Fly
List itself.
Individuals, meanwhile, have found little recourse
against agencies in this realm. For one thing, it is difficult
to find out that one is watch-listed.125 While someone denied
boarding at an airport may infer that she is on the No Fly
List, most individual repercussions of watch listing are
more discreet. They come in the form
of heightened
attention from law enforcement agents126 and others given
125. See, e.g., El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 583 F. Supp. 2d 285, 29596 (D. Conn. 2008) (explaining that, in accordance with its policy, the FBI
“refuses to confirm or deny” the existence of VGTOF records responsive to a
Freedom of Information Act request).
126. For instance, an officer who queries the NCIC for a name that is listed in
the VGTOF may be instructed by the VGTOF text to “APPROACH WITH
CAUTION” and “DETAIN THIS INDIVIDUAL FOR A REASONABLE
AMOUNT OF TIME FOR QUESTIONING” because the “INDIVIDUAL IS OF
INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST TO LAW ENFORCEMENT REGARDING
ASSOCIATION WITH TERRORISM”; the officer will likely be instructed to also
“IMMEDIATELY CONTACT THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER.”
National Crime Information Center; Technical and Operational Update, 13
(Nov. 7, 2005) (document produced in FOIA litigation) (NCIC-VGTOF-6895) (on
file with author). The officer may receive slightly different instructions
depending on how the individual is listed, but in every case the implication is
that the officer should pay particularly careful attention to the individual. See
id. 13-14 (NCIC-VGTOF-6895-96) (“ASK PROBING QUESTIONS TO
DETERMINE IF THIS INDIVIDUAL IS IDENTICAL TO THE PERSON OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT INTEREST. . . . APPROACH WITH CAUTION. . . . DO
NOT ADVISE THIS INDIVIDUAL THAT THEY ARE ON A TERRORIST
WATCHLIST.”). While there have been no studies so far of exactly how watch
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access to watch list entries, which may include private
institutions and non-law enforcement governmental
entities.127 Agencies do not disclose watch list status to the
individual.128
Even if a person is able to discover that she is on a
watch list, she has few avenues of action available. In the
1970s, a line of case law in the D.C. Circuit held that
statutes authorizing law enforcement databases themselves
provide an avenue of redress for people listed incorrectly.129
Another line of cases holds that, even absent a statutory
cause of action, courts have inherent equitable authority to
expunge government records about individuals.130 That
reasoning was used to expunge arrest records when the
arrests were found to have been without probable cause and
for unconstitutional purposes, or when the laws underlying

lists affect the exercise of law enforcement agent discretion, scholarship has
demonstrated that law enforcement officers tend to give increased scrutiny to
people with arrest records even in the absence of subsequent charges or
convictions. Note, The Impact of Arrest Records on the Exercise of Police
Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287, 295-98 (1984) (detailing how,
despite the absence of a necessary relation between arrest records and past
criminality and a lack of evidence that arrest records function as useful
predictors of future criminality, arrest records significantly affect the exercise of
police discretion). It is likely that terrorist watch list entries have similar effects
on discretion, especially since the watch list itself instructs officers to increase
their level of scrutiny.
127. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.12(a) (2012) (authorizing the FBI to share NCIC
records with banks, “certain segments of the securities industry,” “registered
futures associations,” “nuclear power plants,” and “state and local governments
for the purposes of employment and licensing”).
128. See, e.g., El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 258 F.R.D. 198, 205 (D.
Conn. 2009) (asserting that the FBI “properly refused to confirm or deny
whether [an individual] was listed in the VGTOF” in a Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) case, but noting that the balance of interests was different in civil
litigation discovery).
129. See Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding
that the statute authorizing the FBI to collect criminal identity information
implicitly required the FBI to take “reasonable precautions to prevent
inaccuracy”); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1028-29 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding
that the statute authorizing the NCIC impliedly provided a remedy for someone
contesting a record of an arrest that lacked probable cause because the FBI had
an affirmative duty to maintain accurate criminal identification files).
130. See Menard, 498 F.2d at 1025.
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the arrests have been found to be unconstitutional.131 But as
the Supreme Court moved away from implied rights of
action over the following decades,132 these lines of reasoning
grew fallow.133 Moreover, the passage of the Privacy Act in
1974 appeared to provide a statutory avenue of redress even
though, as discussed in the previous Section, it provides
redress only for inaccurate reporting of existing
information—not for spurious predictions or mistaken
evaluations.134 Indeed, precisely because of the subjective
and often vague criteria for inclusion in a watch list—not to
mention their secrecy—it is difficult to contest watch listing
on the grounds of inaccuracy.
The Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) grant of
judicial review to “person[s] . . . adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action” is also of limited use in the
watch list context.135 The adverse effects of watch listing on
an individual include higher scrutiny from a law
enforcement officer, prospective employer, and others.136
Such increased scrutiny has been shown to influence the
exercise of discretion. Even arrest records with no
subsequent records of conviction, which have not been
shown to predict future criminal behavior, influence law
enforcement agent behavior with respect to suspects.137
Given the heightened state of terrorism fear that has
characterized American law enforcement since the terrorist
attacks of 2001, it is safe to conjecture that being on a
131. Id.
132. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (placing strict limits on a court’s
ability to imply a private right of action based on general government
responsibilities absent a specific statutory grant).
133. See, e.g., El Badrawi, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 279-80 (declining to infer a cause
of action in the statute authorizing the FBI to collect criminal information
because the statute did not explicitly waive sovereign immunity).
134. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
135. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
136. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
137. The Impact of Arrest Records on the Exercise of Police Discretion, supra
note 126, at 295-98; see also Herman Goldstein, Confronting the Complexity of
the Policing Function, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION
BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY 23, 33-34 (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank
J. Remington eds., 1993); H. Richard Uviller, The Unworthy Victim: Police
Discretion in the Credibility Call, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 28 (1984).
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terrorist watch list will have serious effects on an
individual’s interaction with government agents. Indeed, as
Seth Kreimer has written, “the discretion of the modern
administrative state is well adapted to low visibility
retaliation,” in which lists ostensibly compiled for law
enforcement purposes can end up being used as tools for
selective prosecution or auditing.138 Moreover, the very
knowledge that one may be the object of government
scrutiny can itself inhibit otherwise licit activities.139
Nonetheless, such aggrievement is difficult to cognize in
court because it is difficult to pinpoint an actual or
imminent concrete harm, as required for standing.140
Whether a court will interpret the predictable effects of
watch listing as an imminent threat depends as much on
the judge’s view of standing as on the actual effects of watch
listing. And many adverse effects of watch listing, such as
visa refusals for foreign nationals, are simply discretionary
and not subject to judicial review.141 A court will not find
aggrievement where a person has no right to any particular
outcome.
Someone who can demonstrate standing should in
principle have access to judicial review of his watch list
status under the APA. But even in that situation, a plaintiff
will face an uphill battle. The APA precludes relief when
“any other statute that [waives sovereign immunity]
expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.”142
If the watch list has been exempted from Privacy Act
requirements, as all terrorists watch lists have, the APA
provision may render any form of relief under the Privacy
Act unavailable, because the exemption prevents relief.

138. Seth F. Kreimer, Watching the Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency, and
Political Freedom in the War on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133, 150 (2004).
139. Id. at 155 (“Fear or suspicion that one’s speech is being monitored . . .,
even without the reality of such activity, can have a seriously inhibiting effect
upon the willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas.”) (quoting Bartnicki
v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001)).
140. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
141. See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 123-24 (2d
Cir. 2009) (discussing the doctrine of “consular unreviewability,” which bars
judicial review of visa issuance or refusal except in limited circumstances).
142. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
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As the recent No Fly List cases demonstrate, there is
one avenue left to a prospective plaintiff: to sue to
expunge—rather than correct—the record, or for additional
process in contesting its existence. Those forms of relief are
not available under the Privacy Act and therefore not
precluded by exemption from it.143 Still, as the novelty of
these cases illustrates, it is only the rare plaintiff who can
fulfill the requirements necessary to sustain a suit. The real
problem, though, as I discuss in the following section, is
that litigation is simply not well suited to address systemic
problems in agency functioning.
C. The Privacy Paradigm and the Language of Litigation
Scholarship on watch lists shares the legal regime’s
predilections. Scholars writing about government databases
generally tend to focus on the way individual privacy rights
bump up against the needs of the nation.144 Like the law, the
literature tends to elide the evaluation and prediction that
go into making a watch list.
Like the law, scholars focus on individual privacy,145
specifically, what is known as information or data privacy.146
143. Even in such a case, at least one court has concluded that sovereign
immunity bars the suit. Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d
249, 279-80 (D. Conn. 2008). Although the Badrawi court did not make clear
how the APA figured in its determination, the implication is that it did not see
the plaintiff as having been “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action,”
which is required for the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. See
Administrative Procedure Act § 702.
144. See Shattuck, supra note 121, at 992 (concluding that including
“information about the non-criminal activities of persons under surveillance by
the Secret Service” in the National Crime Information Center database clearly
violates basic privacy rights); Spencer, supra note 31, at 519 (arguing that
presenting database use as a privacy-security trade-off encourages valuing
security over privacy by “fail[ing] to account for the many unintended
consequences that usually flow from security measures” and presenting security
benefits as unrealistically tangible and certain while presenting privacy harms
as unrealistically abstract and hypothetical); compare, e.g., Soma, supra note 31,
at 287 (“[H]istorically, a return to equilibrium has occurred as the initial threat
dissipates.”), with Vern Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The
Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 TEX. L. REV. 837, 838 (1971).
145. Scholars have been at pains to find something that unifies the diverse
areas to which American law has applied the label of privacy. Jerry Kang has
posited that there are three kinds of privacy rights in American law that assure
individuals decisional (personal choices), spatial (physical sphere), and
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Some commentators working in this vein stress the
psychological importance of information privacy in
constituting individual identities.147 They argue that data
collection impinges on the construction and expression of
the self148 and exacerbates power inequalities between the
surveilling agent and the surveilled subject.149 They also
informational (personal information) control. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy
in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202-05 (1998). This
typology covers the areas that United States law sees as implicating privacy,
but does not suggest an underlying concept uniting the typological
components—perhaps reflecting the lack of underlying logic connecting the
arenas that United States law has labeled private. While accurately depicting
the legal distribution of privacy, this typology also emphasizes that the
American legal conception of privacy rests on doctrinal development and
political history, not on the recognition of an independent entity in the natural
or the social world.
146. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of
Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 358 (2006).
147. Some scholars worry that information-gathering about individuals
impinges on the construction and the expression of individuality itself. They
posit that being observed—either physically or informationally—imposes a kind
of chilling effect on conduct, constraining how people feel they can act and
therefore who they can be. Such writers investigate how surveillance can
organize situations in ways that affect how people behave, and how people feel
they can behave. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and
Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 194 (2008) (describing surveillance as
constricting “the parameters of evolving subjectivity” and limiting how
particular spaces can “function as contexts within which identity is developed
and performed”); Luciano Floridi, The Ontological Interpretation of
Informational Privacy, 7 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 185, 195 (2005) (positing that
persons are constituted by their personal information and interpreting
information privacy as a protection of personal identity); see generally
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 81, at 125-31 (describing the
increased surveillance practices of modern institutions as regimenting and
evaluating individuals according to a norm that is presented as universally
applicable in ways that constrict individual behavior even absent direct
coercion).
148. See, e.g., Kirstie Ball & Frank Webster, The Intensification of
Surveillance, in THE INTENSIFICATION OF SURVEILLANCE: CRIME, TERRORISM AND
WARFARE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 13-14 (Kirstie Ball & Frank Webster eds.,
2003) (identifying one problem with information-gathering about individuals as
the inevitably partial quality of the knowledge garnered, which gives the
surveillor access to the individual’s actions but not his motivations or his real
inner self).
149. See, e.g., id. at 14 (positing that one problem with increased surveillance
is the fact that observers, who “are frequently not known to the subject,” can use
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show how data collection can threaten the very possibility of
community by violating the interactional patterns that
weave communities together, making membership more
perilous and therefore less likely.150 Others emphasize the
legal importance of allowing people to keep information
secret or make it accurate, arguing that due process and
privacy rights are at stake in the government’s collection of
individual information.151 Still others focus on the paucity of
their surveillance for ends the subject does not know about, even though “to
garner information for disguised purposes is morally dubious”).
150. See, e.g., Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L.
REV. 119, 137 (2004) (suggesting that each sphere of social life is governed by
“norms of information flow” that define the kinds of information exchange
appropriate to that context and determine what counts as privacy in that
context); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and
Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989) (proposing that
the concept of privacy “safeguards [the] rules of civility that . . . constitute both
individuals and community”); see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks
Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 974 (2005) (suggesting that whether
someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a given context should
depend on how information usually travels in that particular context). Daniel
Solove, a prominent privacy scholar, has described American thought on privacy
as comprising six primary strands or approaches. While Solove is concerned to
point out their differences, it turns out that each of the six centers on the kinds
of individual rights issues discussed above: control over information about the
individual and the individual’s ability to constitute himself within his
community. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 12-34 (2008). These
strands of thought see privacy as: 1) a right to insist on “seclusion,” id. at 18; 2)
an ability to “conceal[]” or limit access to the individual, id.; 3) a right to secrecy,
id. at 21; 4) control over the flow of information about one’s person, id. at 25; 5)
freedom from the objectifying effects of surveillance, which intrudes on the
aspects of personhood, selfhood, or subjectivity that inheres in limiting the flow
of information about one’s person, id. at 29; and 6) a prerequisite for intimate
relationships and other kinds self- and community-constitution that depend on
interpersonal motivations and choices, id. at 34. Similarly, Solove’s own booklength study of public and private databases focuses on problems involving the
gathering, maintenance, and dissemination of individual information, like
people’s inability to correct mistakes in database records, the government’s
tendency to collect information that it does not need or ought not have, the lack
of legal protection afforded information voluntarily revealed to third parties,
and the difficulty of keeping data secure. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2-8 (2004).
151. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Bond, Note, Defining Disclosure in a Digital Age:
Updating the Privacy Act for the Twenty-First Century, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1232, 1237 (2008) (arguing that the Privacy Act should be amended to further
protect private information from disclosure); Shaina N. Elias, Essay, Challenges
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privacy protections in American law and on the
technological and legal trends that threaten the protections
that do exist.152
Some scholars working on databases generally do
recognize that surveillance affects not just individuals, but

to Inclusion on the “No-Fly List” Should Fly in District Court: Considering the
Jurisdictional Implications of Administrative Agency Structure, 77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1015, 1032 (2009) (urging courts to interpret statutes so as to give
travelers a way to challenge inclusion on such lists); Justin Florence, Note,
Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist Watchlists, 115
YALE L.J. 2148, 2165-81 (2006) (urging agencies to adopt procedures that
respect people’s right to have notice and an opportunity to heard on their
status); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (positing that the Fourth Amendment protects arenas in which an
individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy”); Shaun B. Spencer,
Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843,
913-16 (2002) (arguing that privacy practices affect privacy rights, insofar as
increasing government data collection conditions people to expect fewer rights
and less privacy to begin with).
152. See, e.g., Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A
Comparative Privacy Analysis of Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV.
609, 610 (2007) (“The dangers of any large-scale government effort to collect,
catalogue, and manipulate information on individuals are never far-fetched.”).
Bignami urges the United States to move toward a privacy regime more closely
aligned with the more stringent laws of the major European countries, which
recognize individual information privacy as a fundamental right; strictly limit
private entity data collection and retention; require that government datacollection be specifically authorized by statutes and subject to proportionality
review; and enforce privacy rights through a dedicated, independent agency. Id.
at 635-36, 653. Others warn that legal restrictions on government informationgathering have not kept pace with technological developments that allow for
less legally encumbered, but more effective, government information gathering.
See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 137, 138 (2008). Bellia notes that U.S. privacy law restricts the
government’s “collection and disclosure of certain kinds of information,” but
leaves the retention of information virtually unregulated. Id. Because the
collection and retention of data by private parties, such as service providers, is
also largely unregulated in the United States, Bellia argues, government
agencies can effectively circumvent legal strictures on real-time surveillance by
simply collecting retained data from private third party providers. Id. at 140.
This is facilitated not only by the relatively lax regulation of private parties, but
by technological developments that have rendered third-party data retention
increasingly cost-less and ubiquitous. Id. Bellia urges legal reforms to
ameliorate the “surveillance-enhancing effects” of this new “architecture of
memory” in which little is forgotten. Id.
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entire societies.153 And some have noted that databases not
only collect information about individuals but provide
models on which to “make inferences” about how those
individuals will behave—specifically, how they will spend
money.154 Even this literature, however, generally skips
straight to effects on the individual: it does not ask how
those who work with databases form their predictions.
This literature also tends to assume that information
gathering is always pernicious. This may be why, for this
approach, the difference between good and bad predictions
is not really that important: each is morally repulsive in its
own way.155 Bad predictions show that information
gathering yields only a partial picture, because economistic
models can never capture the intricate complexity of
individual identity. Good predictions instantiate the harms
of surveillance, showing how it constricts free will and
individuality in ways that impinge on our very humanity.
Whatever the value of this assumption in the private
sphere,156 it is less tenable in the public law arena, where
153. See, e.g., Ball & Webster, supra note 148, at 12; David Lyon, Surveillance
as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies, in SURVEILLANCE AS
SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 13, 16-17 (David
Lyon ed., 2003).
154. OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PERSONAL INFORMATION 53 (1993) (quoting KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT
ANALYSIS 37 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Gandy generally
discusses how private parties gather and organize information about individuals
to sort them by economic roles and proclivities, thus “reduc[ing] . . . uncertainty
about individual behavior” in ways that have become “central” to capitalism. Id.
at 45; see id. at 1 (calling this process “the difference machine that guides the
global capitalist system”). Scholars have noted that such predictions themselves
affect economic conduct by constraining the available kinds of money-spending
opportunities that people are presented with. People’s incomes determine the
kind of marketing they receive; their credit histories determine the amount of
credit they are offered; their medical symptoms influence the cost of their health
insurance. See Lyon, supra note 153, at 14, 21, 27.
155. Gandy, for instance, asserts that economic sorting systems are “based on
theoretical models that reflect quite transitory fads or trends in social,
economic, and political thought,” GANDY, supra note 154, at 2-3. But he also
warns that the mechanism’s “methods are constantly being adjusted as” their
conclusions “are evaluated in terms of their contribution to the realization of the
organization’s goals,” which suggests increasing accuracy over time. Id. at 55.
156. In the private, economic arena, such studies tend to frame information
practices as pitting corporations and their profit motives against individuals
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both the harms and the benefits of watch lists redound on
the same society.157 Different evaluative approaches and the
difference between good and bad predictions should matter
to the analysis of government databases, which implicate
questions of government conduct and resource distribution
as well as national well-being.
The literature’s focus on individual rights, which
mirrors the values inscribed in the Privacy Act, fits
comfortably into the more general study of privacy in the
United States, which from its start has been animated by a
concern with the collection and dissemination of
information.158 It also goes along with a search for individual
remedies, usually phrased in the language of litigation.159
This makes sense: our system presents individual rights as
vindicated primarily through courts and court-like
proceedings.160 The normal concerns of courts—like whether
and their nonprofit communities. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 153, at 14. Even in
the private sphere, however, arguments can be made for the benefits of accurate
market categorization: one person’s higher interest rate might result in
another’s easier access to credit.
157. Indeed, the goal of many predictive government databases is precisely to
constrain individual freedom—for instance to engage in violent behavior—to
benefit society at large.
158. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 197-214 (1890). The beginning of American privacy law is usually
dated to a well-known 1890 article in which Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
first posited that the law protected a right to individual privacy. See id. By this
they meant that the individual had a kind of authorial right, as the creator of
the news or image in which he figured, to decide whether it should be made
public. Id. at 204. At the same time, for Warren and Brandeis this kind of
control was superior to a mere right to intellectual property. It instantiated a
“more general right . . . to be let alone,” or, more grandiosely, a right to one’s
own “inviolate personality.” Id. at 205. The authors thus proposed to limit the
personal information available to other people. Id. at 214-20. They did not
discuss what people do with the personal information they get. That evaluative
step has largely lurked in the background of scholarship on privacy and, by
extension, on government databases.
159. For instance, commentators consider how individuals can contest
inclusion in a database through court or court-like processes. See, e.g., Elias,
supra note 151, at 1017, 1029-32 (urging courts to interpret statutes so as to
give travelers a way to challenge inclusion on such lists); Florence, supra note
151, at 2180-81 (urging agencies to adopt procedures that respect people’s right
to have notice and an opportunity to heard on their status).
160. The orientation toward litigation, based on a concern with individual
rights, is not confined to the arena of databases or of privacy. Robert Kagan has,
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including information in a database imposes harms
sufficient to support standing—naturally come into play.
But asking whether someone has suffered standingworthy harm helps us analyze only the propriety of bringing
certain issues to court. It does not help us analyze the
issues themselves.161 The language of litigation can thus
for instance, demonstrated how legal process in America tends to get funneled
into judicial process, creating a “method of policymaking” focused on “rights,
duties, and procedural requirements” rather than cooperation, cost-efficiency, or
efficacy. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 9
(2001). Kagan documents this tendency in the regulatory, as well as in the
criminal and civil context, and concludes that the centrality of judicial process to
American policy and dispute resolution creates a system in which outcomes are
less predictable, but resolutions more costly, than in comparable advanced
democracies. Id. at 3-4. Problems are also more likely to be resolved through
litigation in the first place; judges are more influenced by personal politics;
lawyers play a larger part in shaping legal outcomes even when those outcomes
affect more than just their clients; legal change depends more on the pursuit of
interests by organized groups; and penalties for loss are stiffer. Id. at 3. In the
regulatory context, this leads to a nitpicky and adversarial regulatory style that
tends to prescribe precise methods and actions rather than overall goals and in
which regulators and regulated parties are pitted against one another, often in
court, rather than aiming for cooperative relationships. See id. at 191. Kagan
finds that this regulatory style is both more expensive and less effective than
the more goal-oriented, cooperative style of comparable nations. Id. at 3-4, 19192. He also suggests that this trend has been with us for some time, quoting
Tocqueville’s comment that “[s]carcely any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved . . . into a judicial question.” Id. at vii (quoting
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Vintage Books 1945)
(1835)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Article
III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of
Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 939-46, 997-1000 (2011)
(suggesting that American-style judicial review of administrative action, in
which courts not only determine whether an agency acted within its authority
but also adjudicate what are effectively policy judgments, may lead to a
somewhat chaotic jurisprudence based in policy preference and a continuing
incorporation of time-bound administrative trends in place of technocratic
expertise or executive policy decisions).
161. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 15 (1983) (showing that even administrative action
that has direct effects on individuals and their rights functions primarily via an
“internal law of administration” that precedes, and is largely invisible to,
judicial review). As Mashaw demonstrates, focusing on judicial review of
administrative action largely misses the point: because the ongoing work of
administration happens not in courts but in administrative agencies, court
appearances mark only the exceptional moments when administration is pulled
out of the agency. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
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unproductively constrain analysis, directing it away from
broader questions of accountability in a representative
democracy.162
The litigation-oriented search for a discrete act that
violates a particular right or imposes a particular harm
does not capture the power of predictive database use.163
Neither does the framework of privacy, which focuses on the
individual’s ability to keep independently extant
information from circulation or to cordon off certain areas of
conduct from government control.164 It is not that rights are
not at stake; it is just that more is at stake than rights.
V. TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE LEGAL REGIME
Existing laws controlling terrorist watch lists focus on
factual accuracy and individual rights, not on predictive
CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 302-06 (2012). Relatedly, William Chase has traced the long-time academic
focus on courts in administrative law to the structure of legal education, which,
“intensely committed to the study and teaching of the work product of the
traditional courts,” framed the study of administration as a study of what courts
thought about administration. WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL
AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT 20 (1982).
162. Richard Thompson Ford has also criticized the court-centered approach of
American law, scholarship, and politics from a different but related perspective,
arguing that this approach degrades the goals of social movements by shifting
attention from structural impediments to equality and other social problems,
instead keeping people focused on the narrower, and malleable, question of
individual rights. See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW
LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 21 (2011) (“[R]ights cannot change
deep-seated institutional and cultural injustices without changing the
institutions and culture in which they are rooted.”).
163. For a discussion of ways in which arbitrary classification may infringe on
rights other than privacy, see Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty
Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2010) (arguing that “the rule against
singling out persons for punishment without trial” which constitutes the
Constitutional ban on bills of attainder “should be recognized as a due process
liberty interest” to render improper inclusion on a government blacklist
actionable).
164. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1162-63 (2004) (describing American notions
of privacy as focused on limiting state control over certain areas of life, while
European notions focus on limiting the distribution of information about
individuals more generally).
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process and broad effects. The distinctive power of these
databases to shape political policy and social imaginaries
therefore
remains
largely
unregulated
and
unacknowledged. When we look beyond individual rights
and ask about the government’s responsibilities to the
society it shapes, however, it is this distinctive power that
calls out for constraint.
Creating those constraints is no easy task for three
primary reasons. First, there is no precise science to
predicting human conduct. It is difficult to require
governments to use reliable predictive methods when we do
not know which methods are reliable. Second, the social
effects of watch lists emerge gradually and are not easily
tracked. It is difficult to require governments to minimize or
control a watch list’s social effects when we do not know
how, or how much, it will affect society. Third, watch lists
are subject to complex pressures. We want them to be
correct in their predictions, but not so all-knowing that they
create social classes. We want them to be complete, but not
to skew our perceptions of the conduct they address or allow
arbitrary classifications. And we want them to be costjustified, but do not always know how to measure their costs
and benefits. It is difficult to require governments to change
their practices when we want the changes to have multiple,
possibly incongruent, effects.
At the same time, such difficulties are not new to
agencies that regulate conduct. Limits on knowledge,
resources, and authority make devising effective regulations
difficult. Competing interests complicate regulatory goals.
Yet agencies still act in the face of these difficulties.
Creating an effective legal regime to constrain watch lists
entails applying to the government the very kind of goaloriented mandates, based on partial knowledge, that
government agencies often apply to those they regulate. It
means implementing an “internal law of administration”
that resembles in crucial respects external administrative
regulations.165
165. Cf. Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575
(2010). Rascoff argues that the traditional analogy of domestic intelligence to
criminal law enforcement has led to a “governance vacuum,” id. at 582, because
the analogy belies the actual work of intelligence. Id. at 581-82. Intelligence
work, Rascoff argues, is essentially a kind of “risk assessment,” a crucial
underlying feature of regulation. Id. at 582. Intelligence work is, therefore,
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As I discuss above, research on institutional knowledge
production suggests that the more institutions buy into
their own claims to possess full, objective knowledge about a
given object, the more likely they are to fail to notice aspects
of the object that exceed their grasp. This suggests, perhaps
paradoxically, that accountable prediction requires a good
dose of self-doubt. This Part proposes ways to build selfdoubt into watch lists.
A. Feedback, Internal Consistency, Updating,
Acknowledged Subjectivity
Agencies should be required to create feedback
mechanisms that allow for continual assessments of the
extent to which watch list predictions prove correct.
Agencies should use those feedback inquiries to determine
whether a watch list is internally consistent, in the sense
that it actually targets the kind of activity it is meant to
address. When there is inaccuracy or inconsistency,
agencies should update their watch list processes and
predictions accordingly. I also suggest that agencies should
explicitly acknowledge the subjectivity inherent in watch list
judgment, illuminating rather than obscuring the moments
at which evaluative judgment comes into play.
My proposals ask agencies to assess both the quality of
their watch lists and the process by which they are
produced. And they require agencies to act on those
assessments. Currently, watch list costs are presumed to be
negligible. That assumption relieves agencies of assessing
their benefits. Once we acknowledge that watch lists exact
costs even beyond their monetary upkeep, it is clear that
they require assessment and improvement.
To implement feedback and updating, watch lists
should be structured with the assumption that both
predictions and predictive processes will require
amendment. Individual listings should be subject to
revision, of course: new information should affect old
decisions. But so should predictive criteria and the theory
amenable to the full array of regulatory governance tools. See id; see also Jerry
L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative
Law in the Republican Era 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1739 (2007)
(discussing the “internal law of administration” as a system of administrative
self-constraint).
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that connects them to the relevant conduct: the system
should have provisions not only for altering individual
predictions, but also for changing how agents make
predictions in the first place.166
At present, watch lists lack such provisions. Instead,
they reflect confidence that the assumptions guiding them
will hold true and that their predictions will be correct.
Instead of regular self-assessments built into the evaluative
process, they are often subject only to partial or periodic
external reviews, such as the occasional studies carried out
by inspectors general or the Government Accountability
Office.167 Each such review has its own focus, objectives, and
methods, leading to evaluations that, though often
excellent, are still piecemeal.168
Commentators have pressed for administrative agencies
to be subject to more frequent, more regular, and more
searching evaluations. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, for
instance, has proposed creating an independent commission
to audit discretionary agency actions.169 Cuéllar suggests
evaluating random samples of discretionary decisions to see
how well they adhere to decision-making standards
articulated prior to the review.170 In contrast to judicial
review, which casts only a limited light on a very few agency
actions, in-depth audits would give legislatures, the public,

166. The consolidated terrorist identity watch list operated by the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) does have mechanisms for removing
individuals from the watch list, though these are in practice often not
implemented. THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST WATCHLIST
NOMINATION PRACTICES, supra note 53, at xvi (finding, in a sample of eighty-five
closed investigations, that seventeen entries correctly remained on the watch
list for other reasons or were properly removed in a timely manner; sixty-one
entries were properly removed but not in a timely manner; and seven entries
improperly remained on the list). What is required, though, is not only a way to
adjust individual listings but a way to change systemic criteria for listing.
167. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 227, 291 (2006) (discussing the limitations of current executive
review mechanisms).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 231-32.
170. Id. at 240.
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and agencies themselves a better understanding of everyday
administrative activities.171
Relatedly, Michael Greenstone has proposed creating a
new legislative office to evaluate the actual impact of
regulations over time.172 He also suggests establishing a
standard, agency-internal “retrospective analysis” of the
actual effects, including the actual costs and benefits, of
regulations.173 These proposals aim to overcome the
unrealistic optimism endemic to American administration,
which historically has estimated the “likely benefits and
costs” of regulations “before they are enacted.”174 “[B]ecause
the regulations are untested” prior to their enactment,
however, it is impossible to assess their actual effects.175
This administrative attitude thus has things a bit
backward, as “[o]nce a regulation is implemented, it goes on
the books and generally stays there unexamined for years
and in some cases decades,”176 even if its costs or benefits
differ from those predicted.
Cuéllar and Greenstone suggest that regular
assessments of government actions can help overcome the
unrealistic impulses of decision makers by confronting them
with the actual results of their decisions.177 Watch lists
171. See id. at 252-274.
172. Improving Regulatory Performance: Lessons from the United Kingdom:
Statement Presented to the S. Budget Comm. Task Force on Gov’t Performance 4
(2011) (statement of Michael Greenstone) [hereinafter Improving Regulatory
Performance:
Lessons
from
the
United
Kingdom],
available
at
budget.senate.gov/democratic/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=b1b6d27f-8f1c-4370a42e-432ebf4d8885 (proposing a new office, modeled on the Congressional
Budget Office and housed within Congress, to evaluate the effects of
implemented regulations); see also Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg., 3822
(Jan. 18, 2011), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-01-21/pdf/20111385.pdf (requiring agencies to “consider how best to promote retrospective
analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively
burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance
with what has been learned”).
173. Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3822.
174. Improving Regulatory Performance: Lessons from the United Kingdom,
supra note 172, at 3.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Other scholarship suggests that similar reviews can benefit intragovernmental practices as well. See Shapiro & Morrall III, supra note 29, at 190
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inherit the unrealistic optimism and confidence of the
bodies that create them. That self-confidence encourages
the ossification of evaluative approaches to a dynamic
object; it also encourages some sloppiness in applying the
evaluative approaches.178 Building in updating mechanisms
could check these unrealistic impulses by incorporating
evolving understandings of the phenomena that databases
address. And it would allow databases to keep up with the
changing nature of these phenomena—facts on the
ground—which themselves react and change in response to
government actions.179
Building in feedback and updating mechanisms would
also help alert government bodies to mismatches between
the criteria used to make predictions and the kind of
prediction being made.180 That kind of mismatch is evident
(finding that increasing information used for benefit-cost analysis did not
increase the benefits of regulations, and that political salience decreased them).
178. THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST WATCHLIST
NOMINATION PRACTICES, supra note 53, at v, vi, 1 (finding the process for listing
individuals who are not currently under investigation by the FBI on FBI
terrorist watch lists flawed: the agency routinely failed to follow its own policy
for reviewing proposals to include new names on the watch lists; had “no formal
or active process to update or remove” names that had not been reviewed; and
commonly included names with “little or no information explaining why the
subject may have a nexus to terrorism”; the agency had no way to remove or
modify entries submitted via particular routes; and 35% of the over 68,000
identities originating from FBI watch lists were “associated with FBI cases that
did not contain current . . . terrorism designations,” but rather arose from cases
that had been closed or were “unrelated to terrorism”).
179. See, e.g., HACKING, THE TAMING OF CHANCE, supra note 81, at 2 (noting
that descriptions of and theories about human conduct tend to have a “feedback
effect” that affects the very conduct they address). Hacking focuses on socialscientific descriptions and theories, but the point applies with equal force to
government-based understandings of human conduct, which are themselves
often based on social-scientific theories and their popularizations, as well as
prevalent social attitudes more generally. Perhaps most crucially, governmentbased understandings can act on the world in even more powerful ways than
social-scientific theories, for instance by subjecting classes of people to legal
requirements or increased attention from government agents.
180. Cf. HARCOURT, supra note 33, at 23. Harcourt argues that the goal of
profiling—to catch criminal acts within a particular population—can be
counterproductive to achieving the broader goal of law enforcement—to reduce
crime in general—because the profiled population may reduce its criminal
behavior less than the non-profiled population may increase its own criminal
behavior. See id. In other words, Harcourt argues, even though profiling is used

524

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

in the FBI’s VGTOF list, which connects gang-based criteria
to terrorist conduct.181
Several factors can help indicate how attenuated
predictive criteria are from the conduct predicted ex ante.
We can ask how precise the criteria are. Do they pick out
specific facts that are easily distinguished from other facts,
or are they fairly mushy? We can ask how standard the
criteria are. Do they compel a particular prediction across
evaluators, or do they leave a lot of room for individual
interpretation? And we can ask how well articulated the
theory underlying the criteria is. Is there a strong argument
that the criteria actually identify the conduct the database
addresses?
Most importantly, however, the relation of criteria to
prediction is open to empirical testing ex post.182 Feedback
and updating mechanisms should compel those who
maintain predictive government databases to evaluate
whether the information they use actually serves, over time,
to pick out the conduct they target.
For example, the National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System (NSEERS), which required people from
certain countries to register with DHS upon arrival in the
United States and at regular intervals thereafter, was
meant to address national security threats.183 Based on an
implicit prediction that visitors from particular countries
would pose heightened national security threats, this
database contained information about the identities and
location of immigrants and visitors from twenty-five
countries.184 But the extent to which simply having that
information effectively targeted national security risks was
as a tool of law enforcement, the effects of profiling turn out to be inconsistent
with the goals of law enforcement. See id.
181. See discussion supra Part I.B.
182. See discussion supra Part V.A.
183. The countries whose residents were required to register were:
“Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates,
and Yemen.” Removing Designated Countries From the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), 76 Fed. Reg. 23,830 (Apr. 28, 2011)
[hereinafter Removing Designated Countries From NSEERS].
184. See id.
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low: a review of publicly available information about the
program found it “unsuccessful as a counterterrorism
tool.”185 Its main effect was to net ordinary people who had
overstayed their visas or failed to comply with the
somewhat arcane NSEERS requirements themselves.186
It seems likely that DHS evaluated the actual results of
NSEERS and noted the internal inconsistency of
information with target, because the NSEERS program was
suspended in 2011 in order to “eliminate redundancies;
streamline the collection of data for individuals entering or
exiting the United States, regardless of nationality; and
enhance the capabilities of our security personnel.”187
The more the criteria used to make a watch list
prediction are attenuated from the conduct predicted, then,
the more we can expect a watch list to miss its purpose of
predicting specific conduct on the part of particular
people.188 Requiring databases to include provisions for
feedback-based revision may help counteract such
inconsistencies.
Finally, one implication of studies like James Scott’s is
that a watch list built on an assumption that its standards
are objective and its knowledge totalizing will inevitably
confuse the priorities of its creators with the realities of its
objects.189 Similarly, when the subjective elements of
prediction are obscured, those making and using databases
may easily mistake opinion for fact. To counteract these
185. PENN STATE UNIV., DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW, NSEERS: THE
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S EFFORTS TO SECURE ITS BORDERS, 6 (Mar. 31, 2009),
www.adc.org/PDF/nseerspaper.pdf.
186. See id.
187. Important NSEERS Information, IMMIGRATION DAILY (May 20, 2011),
http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/2011,0524-nseers.shtm;
see
Removing Designated Countries From NSEERS, supra note 183, at 23,831.
DHS has not technically cancelled NSEERS but only suspended it by relieving
any visitors from its reporting requirements. The regulations creating the
program are still in effect, and the program thus stands ready to be reimplemented at any time.
188. Cf. David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92
IOWA L. REV. 1359, 1364 (2007) (arguing that bureaucracies created for limited
civilian purposes will predictably fail when pressed into national security
service because of a mismatch of goals and techniques).
189. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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results, an effective legal regime for predictive government
databases should require that watch lists acknowledge the
subjective and partial nature of their predictions and, if
possible, use them to the watch lists’ advantage by
encouraging better judgment in government agents.
Instead, watch lists are often structured to obscure their
dependence on judgment, phrasing their evaluative process
in objective terms—as though the mere existence of
information itself necessitated certain predictions. This
misrepresents the actual evaluative process of prediction,
which requires that information be interpreted.
Agents and agencies facing outside audiences may
naturally be tempted to present watch listing processes as
more objective than they really are. But such
representations may also obscure the role of subjective
judgment to internal audiences: the very agents making the
predictions. Agents exercising their subjective judgment
may be encouraged to think of their activity as merely
reading truth off of information. Such misunderstandings
exacerbate the self-blinding effects of overconfidence.
Acknowledging subjective components, in contrast, can
increase users’ awareness of the limitations and quirks of
database predictions. Combined with external feedback, it
can also help governments harness subjectivity by focusing
training or changing criteria based on the database’s realworld performance.
B. Directions for Reform
How can we include feedback, updating, internal
consistency, and acknowledged subjectivity in watch lists to
counteract their perverse incentives? The clearest route
would be statutory: Congress should amend the Privacy Act
to eliminate or tighten the exemptions to its relevance,
timeliness, completeness, and accuracy requirements.190
This would affect many databases, not just watch lists. But
the effect would be salutary. In areas where certainty is
relatively easy to achieve—either because the database
merely compiles independently existing information or
because its predictions are well-tested and based on a

190. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) (2006).
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wealth of historical data—the requirements should be
relatively simple to fulfill.
In areas of high uncertainty like terrorist watch lists, in
contrast, imposing these requirements would push agencies
to consider what relevance, timeliness, completeness, and
accuracy means in a particular context. The agency could
define these statutory terms in regulations specific to each
particular watch list, which would require it to determine
what level of relevance, timeliness, completeness, and
accuracy was appropriate for that watch list. This process
would encourage agencies to gather evidence about how
watch list predictions fare in the real world in order to
determine what the statutory terms should mean in any
given context.
The agency’s definition of these statutory terms should
appear in the System of Records Notice the Privacy Act
already requires when a database is created or modified.191
This would require the agency to consider the purpose of its
predictions and think about how they relate to their realworld objects.192 It would provide pre-articulated standards
that would render the database amenable to external or
internal audits.193 And it would increase the transparency of
watch lists, allowing executive actors, legislators, and the
public to evaluate them.
For instance, an early articulation of how the VGTOF’s
criteria were meant to pinpoint terrorist activity might have
alerted the agency to the potential mismatch of some
criteria to the database’s target. If such an articulation
would reveal sensitive information, the modified Privacy
Act provision could contain a secrecy clause allowing
agencies to make the articulation internally, or to
Congressional bodies only.194 While a public enunciation of
standards facilitates widespread evaluation of the social
effects of a watch list, the main thrust of my proposal is that
191. § 552a(e)(4).
192. Such standards might resemble the data “minimization” efforts that the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requires before information may be
shared. See 150 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2006).
193. See Cuéllar, supra note 167, at 285-86.
194. Cf. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 334-35 (2010)
(proposing that government secrets should be revealed to different publics
depending on their level of sensitivity).
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explicit articulation—even to limited audiences—should be
part of the process of developing such databases.
Once a watch list is developed, moreover, agencies
should be required to subject it to regular investigation to
determine how it actually functions. A Privacy Act
amendment should require agencies to develop ongoing
evaluations of how watch list predictions hold up. The
outlines of the assessment protocol should be provided in
the System of Records Notice, which should explain how the
agency plans to review the watch list’s efficacy and how
often it plans to implement reviews.
These evaluations should be tied to ongoing revisions of
predictions and predictive processes, so that updating is a
natural and continuous result of feedback. Selfassessments, in other words, should be followed by
improvements based upon them. The same Privacy Act
amendment should require agencies to update their System
of Records Notice for each watch list periodically to explain,
in general terms, what self-assessment has revealed and
what the agency will do about it. Such a process would
make watch lists more efficacious and more transparent. It
would also serve as a signal to agents and agencies that
watch list judgments are imperfect and subject to
modification. A fuller report distributed to relevant agency
personnel should detail watch list failings, which would also
help keep agents aware of the quality of their predictions.
The agency’s feedback and updating approach,
furthermore, should itself be subject to external reviews.
These investigations could take a variety of forms. They
may involve in-depth audits of database predictions like
those suggested by Cuéllar for other discretionary
practices.195 They may also, on the model of scientific
studies, include long-term studies of specific watch-listed
subjects to determine the extent to which predictions or
investigative actions based on these evaluations turn out to
be reliable.196

195. See Cuéllar, supra note 167, at 232, 252-74.
196. This resembles the retrospective review of actual policy effects suggested
by Greenstone in Improving Regulatory Performance: Lessons from the United
Kingdom, supra note 172, at 3, and initiated by Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 3822, at 3822.
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A Privacy Act amendment is the best way to impose
these new constraints. But an agency concerned with the
efficacy of its watch list could implement these proposals on
its own. Although a change in incentive structure might
work best when imposed by the legislature, an agency
leadership dedicated to efficacy can implement such change
from the inside.
Another agency-internal change that would improve
watch list judgments would remind evaluators of the
subjective nature of their evaluations. Such efforts might
include reverting to more narrative, explanatory approaches
that require agents not only to provide information
supporting their predictions but also to make explicit their
own interpretations of that information. This approach
would counteract the implications of objectivity that
checklists of criteria create.
Narrative explanations should be included in ongoing
reviews to help determine how government agents actually
make predictions about terrorist conduct. They could also be
subjected to dialogue and dissent by having several agents
participate in making a prediction.197 This would increase
attention to reasoning and evaluative processes and
awareness of personal predilections.
Of course, these are not simple fixes, and they are not
guaranteed to work. Promoting dialogue may exacerbate
patterns of weak reasoning or encourage groupthink or
reasoning to extremes. At the same time, this approach
might at least remind agents that evaluation, rather than
merely information collection, is the central step in watch
list predictions.
These may seem like costly measures to take simply to
manage a list. Watch lists, after all, are not generally seen
to be a method of implementing or creating policy. They are
merely a tool for keeping track of those that policy
addresses. But this view accepts the seemingly neutral,
objective nature of databases. If databases are mere
repositories of information available for other uses, there
seems little point in expending effort to control them.

197. Such a dialogic endeavor resembles so-called red team analysis or
“[d]issent [c]hannel” provisions that aim to encourage productive internal
disagreements. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 2328.

530

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

But if we see watch lists as themselves creating
knowledge through the evaluation of individuals, the
question of costs looks different. The classification of
individuals in watch lists can have profound implications
for how they can live their lives. And the facts that watch
lists report about our world can influence our policies: how
much effort we want to spend on combating terrorism and
what kind of effort we think will work. In this way, watch
lists become black boxes undergirding larger theories,
policies, and worldviews.198 They tell us what our social
world looks like: who inhabits it and what dangers it poses.
And we use what they tell us without knowing how they
came to their conclusions or how valid those conclusions
are. In this light, it becomes more important to assess how
much the facts that watch lists produce correspond with
reality.
CONCLUSION
A. Other Predictive Databases
This Article has focused on terrorist watch lists. But
terrorist watch lists are just one example of a type:
government databases used to predict human conduct. Such
databases will be subject to radically different incentive
structures than those surrounding terrorist watch lists. For
instance, correct predictions in some databases have a clear
monetary payoff and operate in relatively low-salience
fields. When that is the case, we can expect agencies to
incorporate self-assessment mechanisms naturally into
their predictive processes. Self-assessment is relatively easy
when money is at stake both because the accuracy of a
prediction is presented in clear terms and because monetary
value makes the relationship between false negatives and
false positives easier to quantify. And lower salience puts
less pressure on agencies to appear active, allowing for
simpler ways to implement corrections that improve
efficacy.
198. Cf. LATOUR, supra note 66, at 130-31 (arguing that scientific citation
itself, quite aside from experimental proof, has a fact-making power, because
repeated citation of a claim based on an experiment tends to give the claim an
unquestionable factual status in the community of scientists, rendering the
original evidence and analysis on which the claim was based a “black box”
impervious to further investigation).
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But in similarly high-salience fields with no clear way of
quantifying accuracy, we can expect databases used for
prediction to face similar problems as terrorist watch lists.
This is so irrespective of whether the databases are created
and managed by administrative agencies, as terrorist watch
lists are, or by Congress itself. For instance, Congress has
required all states to keep publicly accessible registries of
convicted sex offenders.199 The government itself does not
offer a prediction in this case. It only mandates the
disclosure of information so that individual members of the
public may make their own predictions about the convict’s
future conduct.200 At the same time, that mandate also
implies that this is the information the public needs to form
a reliable assessment: the concept of an offender registry is
based on the implicit prediction that people convicted of
certain crimes are likely to recidivate.
Yet empirical research has repeatedly called into
question the predictive utility of previous sex offenses for
recidivism.201 And neither the statute nor its implementing
199. See generally Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub.
L. 109-248, 120 Stat 587, 596 (2006) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 16912 (2006).
200. See id. This is a form of “mandated disclosure.” See Omri Ben-Shahar &
Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647,
649 (2011). Ben-Shahar and Schneider explain that “[t]he technique requires
‘the discloser’ to give ‘the disclosee’ information which the disclosee may use to
make better decisions and to keep the discloser from abusing its superior
position.” Id. The aim is “to improve decisions people make in their economic
and social relationships and particularly to protect the naive from the
sophisticated.” Id. Ben-Shahar and Schneider document the failure of mandated
disclosure to achieve these goals and present a number of reasons for that
failure. See id. at 679 (beginning discussion of reasons for failure). One benefit
of subjecting registries to the self-assessment mechanisms I propose discussion
supra Part V.B., is in revealing which registries fail to achieve their goals and
why.
201. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS
US, 3, 9 (Sept. 2007), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
us0907webwcover.pdf (documenting the absence of “convincing evidence of
public safety gains” from registration requirements and noting that such
requirements may be “counterproductive” because “the proliferation of people
required to register” for non-serious crimes “makes it harder for law
enforcement to determine which [registrants] warrant careful monitoring”).
Registration also diverts law enforcement resources to tracking registrants,
determining who has failed to register, and prosecuting those who do so, even
though these expenditures do little to effectuate the database’s goal of lowering
the incidence of and opportunity for sex crime commission. See, e.g., Andrew J.
IN THE
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regulations articulate a theory of recidivism to explain the
registration requirements. It may well be that registration
prevents recidivism. But it may also be that severe
registration requirements inspire greater efforts to avoid
registration and divert law enforcement attention from sex
offense to registration maintenance. Without articulating
how the requirements relate to the law’s goals, it is difficult
for the government to assess the system’s internal
consistency and efficacy.202
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(“SORNA”), which is the sex offender registration statute,
does leave an avenue open for self-assessment: it requires
the Attorney General to constitute a task force to study the
relative merits of individualized risk assessments versus
registration based on conviction category.203 However, the
Harris and Christopher Lobanov-Rostovsky, Implementing the Adam Walsh
Act’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Provisions: A Survey of the
States, 21 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 202, 203 (2010) (noting that no state had
achieved compliance with the statute’s registration requirements by the
deadline of July 2009); Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed
Promise of Administrative Federalism, 78 GEO. WASH L. REV. 993, 1009 n.96
(2010) (noting the high costs of implementing the statute’s registration and
notification requirements and quoting the California Sex Offender Management
Board as stating that this cost would exceed the amount of federal funding that
California would forego if it failed to implement the statute’s provisions).
202. For instance, noting that “SORNA’s tiering structure” does not
“supersede[]” but supplements local “jurisdictions’ existing risk assessment
processes” for sex offenders, the DOJ has called the notion that the tiering
structure “is meant to help predict sexual reoffense” a “misconception.” DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING, MONITORING, APPREHENDING,
REGISTERING, AND TRACKING, SMARTWATCH, SORNA: ADDRESSING THE
CHALLENGES
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/smartwatch/09_august/SORNA_challenges.html
; see 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006) (defining the sec offender tiers). But it is unclear
what purpose other than prediction the system could serve, and the DOJ
instructions do not suggest any. The statute itself states that it was passed “[i]n
order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children,”
which suggests that tiers are allocated based on the likelihood of offense. 42
U.S.C. § 16901 (2006). This mismatch between the official explanation of the
statute and the statute’s only apparent purpose makes it yet more difficult to
assess the database’s effects.
203. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 § 637, 120 Stat. at
645-46. The statute requires the Attorney General to present the task force’s
conclusions to Congress within 18 months of SORNA’s passage, but a search of
the Department of Justice website produced no such study.
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statute contains no provisions for updating or evaluation of
the extent to which the registry serves its goals at all.
None of these defects should be surprising given the
analysis in this article. Sex offenses, like terrorism, are a
complex, high-salience area with a limited amount of
historical data on which to base predictions and no clear
monetary payoff for correct predictions. We should expect
government databases in this arena to be internally
inconsistent, to contain few self-assessment mechanisms, to
rely on implicit assumptions rather than articulated
theories, and to appear more objective than they really are.
While my proposals would work differently in the legislative
arena of SORNA—where Congress would have to impose
limits not just on agencies, but on itself—the substance and
logic carry over. As government databases continue
growing, moreover, and as their uses continue to expand, we
can expect ever more databases to be used for prediction,
and ever more to suffer from the problems I have described.
B. Dilemmas of Knowledge
This Article has drawn attention to the distinctive
features of terrorist watch lists and other databases used to
predict human conduct. I have argued that characteristics
such
as
ease
of
combination,
portability,
decontextualization, impersonality, and diffusion of
evaluative labor can make such databases powerful. But
these same characteristics can also undermine them,
causing problems for the agencies that maintain them, the
governments that commission them, and the public they
serve.
Despite this potential for harm, the legal regime that
constrains government databases recognizes only the harms
they cause individuals, such as producing inaccurate
records, invading privacy, and, at the margins, infringing a
right to travel. I have proposed addressing that legal lacuna
by requiring such databases to build in efficacy standards;
to test and revise their prediction protocols; and to make
their subjective elements explicit to those who use them.
My analysis raises two related conundrums. First, the
conundrum of overconfidence and self-correction. I conclude
above that states trust their conclusions at their peril, and
that attempts at ultimate, total knowledge will predictably
fail. I propose a way to guard against this failure: give up
attempts at total knowledge; assume that any prediction
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will be partial and have flaws; construct databases with
ongoing self-correction mechanisms to account for inevitable
failures.
But the solution seems to ignore the problem. Doesn’t
this attempt at self-correction display the very selfaggrandizing overconfidence it is meant to combat? Can we
avoid
overconfidence
in
results
by
substituting
overconfidence in methods?
There is no satisfying way out of this contradiction,
which pits our increasing knowledge of the world against
our increasing understanding that knowledge is always
limited. The real answer to the conundrum would be to
eliminate predictive government databases altogether. But
we have known for decades that modern states are defined
by their production of knowledge about their populations.
The portable, combinable, diffuse nature of predictive
government database use is, in turn, characteristic of
modern forms of knowledge more generally. Calling for the
elimination of such databases altogether would be asking
the scorpion not to sting the frog. My proposals are thus not
solutions to the underlying problem, but ways to soften its
worst symptoms.
Second, I state above that the broader normative issues
that these databases raise have to do with how people
conceptualize their society. Governmental predictions create
social categories that affect social structure and political
policy. But the reforms I propose do not stop governments
from making predictions or having social effects. Doesn’t
insisting on better categories miss the point?
Again, there is no ultimate solution: government
representations will always affect, and not just reflect, the
societies they represent. Again, all we can strive for is
amelioration. The first step is recognition: the effects of
government pronouncements go deeper when they are not
recognized as effects at all. Requiring watch lists to confront
their users with the complexities of their internal
production and with the vagaries of the world they analyze
brings their contingencies to the fore. That will not be the
last word on the issue of their social effects. But it would
allow us to start a conversation about them.
Government databases used for predictions about
human conduct are currently treated as neutral
instruments of government policy. Bringing their
limitations and effects to the surface refigures them as
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creative creatures that can affect policy as well. That
provides a first step toward dealing with their normative
implications. Both the dilemma of knowledge and the
inevitability of effects admit of only partial solutions; but
partial solutions are better than none at all.

